Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, 2003, 2 http://www.units.it/etica/INTRODUCTION.htm Guest
Editors’ Preface Dipartimento di
Scienze della Politica Visiting Fellow When thirty years ago, in 1974, Robert
Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia
(1) was
first released, “Libertarianism” was a word scarcely used in the political
discourse. Nozick’s book came as an unexpected answer to John Rawls’
ground-breaking A Theory of Justice,
(2) a work that was to re-shape the landscape
of contemporary political philosophy. (3) Nozick’s work bestowed new philosophical
dignity upon a set of ideas that was not “new” in any meaningful sense;
though Libertarianism as a political movement emerged in the United States of
America precisely during the Seventies, heralded by Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia as well as
by Murray N. Rothbard’s For a New Liberty,
(4)
with the unforgettable subtitle “A Libertarian Manifesto”, (5) those principles to
which libertarians gained a new life had long been dancing on the stage of
history. What’s truly peculiar to the most recent development is the
rejection of the legitimacy of an even “minimal” government (vis-à-vis the Nozickian solution). It is often difficult to distinguish between
“Libertarianism” and “Classical Liberalism”. Those two labels are used almost
interchangeably by those who we may call libertarians of a “minarchist”
persuasion: scholars who, following Locke and Nozick, believe a State is
needed in order to achieve effective protection of property rights. (6) Alas, often those who follow Nozick’s footsteps when
proposing an “ultra-minimal” state end up in what we may dare calling a
theoretical impasse; to those who
believe there is a need for government – but share a fundamental distrust of
political power, we may suggest that what’s needed is a “voluntarily
financed” form of government. (7) Machan speaks of the possibility of
“the institution of government but with no coercive powers”, considering
government with the monopoly of force as a “natural monopoly”. The monopoly being considered in this context could
well be necessary yet not coercive. It does not mean that there can only be
one government in the world but that in any reasonably sized homogeneous
geographical area, only one such institution makes sense. This is
arguable in view of the kind of service government (or call it what you will,
say, legal authority) is to deliver to citizens, its customers), just as some
other providers would have a monopoly, at least over some period of time
(e.g., an airline, while you are traveling, an apartment house, a gated
community). (8) Machan does not go as far as explaining how it could
be possible to have a government
without taxation (turning taxation
into voluntary fees isn’t an easy accomplishment, even for a distinguished
philosopher) and, generally speaking, coercion,
the peculiar activity that distinguishes government from any other agency in
society. Interestingly, Carlo Lottieri reverses this
very argument in his essay included in the present issue of Etica &
Politica / Ethcis & Politics. Lottieri, following Rothbard, (9) Leoni,
(10)
and Salin, (11)
argues for the legitimacy of many so-called “monopolistic practices”
(cartels, monopolization, mergers, predatory pricing…), and for the
legitimacy of conglomerates, and big business at large, vis-à-vis those governmental agencies built to thoroughly
implement “competition” from top to bottom. (12) Thus, Lottieri compares private and
legal monopolies. The latter have long been the bête noire of classical liberals who have always – to mention but
one example – opposed protectionist measures that favored special interests.
Government, being per se the source of legal protections, cannot be equated
with private sector’s so-called “monopolies”. These first remarks can bring us to evaluate,
however briefly, what constitutes the trait-d’-union
between “Minarchism” and “Anarcho-capitalism” – that is, between the
tradition that accepts – however minimal – government, and the tradition that
rejects it within the boundaries of libertarian thought. What is shared is, in our opinion, the libertarian theory of justice: a distribution of goods, assets and
talents in society is legitimate and should be lawful insofar as it is the
(provisional) last ring in a chain of legitimate acts. “A distribution is
just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the
distribution”. (13) Libertarianism is a theory of distributive
justice, historical and deontological, whereas dominant contemporary theories
(such as Rawlsian “liberalism”) are patterned theories evaluating
distribution by different criteria than its legitimacy in terms of historical
lawfulness as a chain of legitimate (non-aggressive) acts, and rest upon this
or that particular set of egalitarian principles. To take advantage of a
useful distinction developed by Anthony de Jasay, contemporary “liberal”
theories of justice are best summarized by the principle “to each, according
to …” (his/her race, his/her merits, his/her gender, his/her social class,
etcetera); whereas libertarianism sticks with the maxim “suum cuique” (14) – give to anyone what is due to him:
that is, what he legitimately acquired by inventing, discovering (i.e.,
appropriating), or voluntarily exchanging property. The distinct value of Libertarianism, in the
realm of contemporary theories of justice, is exactly to cast light Libertarianism, in a nutshell, is all about
the backing. (16) Anarchists and monarchists, sharing a common
theory of justice, fundamentally disagree on the conditions under which
property could be protested best. The protection of property is what anarchists
emphasize: legitimate distribution should not suffer any kind of interference
by an ultimate decision maker, even if the use of coercion is strictly
limited. No matter how limited, it is illegitimate.
But here comes the issue of law and order: should law be imposed as legislation upon a market (a society), or
is it an output of claims and interactions within a market (a society) on its
own right? And if we accept the
second option, could the state be conceived as the enforcer of laws that it
didn’t produce? Since Nozick’s opus magnum was published,
libertarians engaged in different theoretical debates, supplying many insights
thanks to a fairly relevant number of scholars. The first issue of the Journal of Libertarian Studies debated
and debunked the first part of Anarchy,
State, and Utopia, building on the theoretical consistency of the
anarchist option. (17) Murray Rothbard’s and, more recently, Bruce Benson’s and
Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s works on the private production of defense (18) made anarchy a much
more attractive scenario. The existence of public goods and the necessity for
their public provision have been questioned in a number of relevant works. (19)
Philosophers such as Jan Narveson developed a consistent libertarian approach
that is not strictly based on Natural Rights as understood by theorists of
“Lockean rights” such as Nozick and Rothbard. (20) The issue of Natural Law and Natural
Rights among libertarians has been largely debated, and a philosopher as
prominent as Henry B. Veatch admitted that his interest in this field was
prompted exactly by these disputes. (21) Perhaps, most important of all,
libertarians can count in their ranks a philosopher as original as Anthony de
Jasay, who has given many priceless insights: on the emergence of conventions
and, most notably, on the respect for property in a stateless society, on the
problem of public goods, and on the feasibility of constitutionalism. (22) This last point is of the greatest importance. Libertarianism
is often accused to be “utopian”, “politically unfeasible” (and so what?...
We are tempted to say: political feasibility is merely contingent, and it
doesn’t say much about the value of a theory), even “constructivist”. (23) The
truth is rather the opposite: libertarian scholars in the no-government
tradition merely apply the assumption of self-interest to government
relationships. In that regard, it is worth noting that the most consistent
approach to libertarianism has been developed in a stringent critique of so
called “public choice” and “constitutional economics”. (24) Libertarianism is
indeed based on a realist anthropology, which assumes fallibility,
imperfection, and self-interest, and therefore
rejects government: because people in government are as far from being angels
as anyone is. Anarcho-capitalism bases most of its
attractiveness on the fact that the “minimal state”, if ever existed, never
remained “minimal”, but always grew larger. For the assumption of
self-interest, government officials will always try to maximize their utility
as anyone else. If so, keeping a state “small” is like trying to straighten
the crooked wood of humanity. But debates among libertarians do not concern
only the crucial theoretical question (should we be governed?) of political
philosophy. Libertarians have debated on intellectual property, contracts,
banking, and on many other issues. This is a grand proof of how lively this
movement of ideas is, especially in the United States but – at least at an
academic level – in Europe as well. This issue of Etica & Politica / Ethics
& Politics aims to provide the reader with a glimpse of all these
sparkling debates. Jan Narveson defends the prospects of a
stateless society vis-à-vis a
minimal state, providing a new perspective on a hoary debate. Frank Van Dun
explains the relevancy of natural law for anarcho-capitalism. Hardy Bouillon
examines competing definitions of freedom, and supplies a new one. Hans-Hermann Hoppe deals with
monetary issues and with what he calls “monetary imperialism”. Carlo Stagnaro
defends the right to bring and carry guns as an essential part of the
libertarian tradition of thought, rejecting the common objections raised by
advocates of the monopoly of violence. Walter Block proposes the challenge of
roads’ privatization. Guglielmo Piombini assesses the debate
between the so-called “left-libertarianism” (25) and the so-called
“paleo-libertarianism”, arguing for a reconciliation of laissez faire and
traditional morality. By the same token, Paolo Zanotto examines the
contributions of Juan de Mariana in the light of contemporary libertarian
theory. Libertarians can provide new perspective on
current affairs as well as social thought. Tom Palmer examines economic
globalization from a libertarian perspective, and reminds us of the robust
link that connects cosmopolitanism and classical liberalism, criticizing at
the time the attitudes shown by contemporary “communitarians”. Wendy McElroy
proposes a different approach to feminism and gender issues, which builds
upon the great truths of methodological individualism, which are central in
any true libertarian perspective. An account of the most relevant libertarian
scholarship is provided by Nicola Iannello, in his robust bibliographical
essay. Those debates and disputes, the large number
of scholars in fields such as political philosophy, economics, and social
theory (not to mention journalists and political analysts) who are working
within the libertarian framework, are truly impressive and confront all with
a factual reality: libertarianism is no longer a philosophical eccentricity,
but a stream of thought whose contributions to contemporary political
philosophy can’t be simply ignored. Wishing that this issue of Etica & Politica / Ethics &
Politics contributes to a serious debate in Italy over these themes, we
would like to close this introduction by expressing the sincere hope that –
at least at a theoretical level – a growing number of scholars would, in the
coming years, recognize what Anthony de Jasay writes in this journal: Opportunism, not efficiency, is the motive
force of the most important collective choices. Substantially all
redistributive functions undertaken by the state can be explained by the fact
that while people have unequal abilities and resources, they have equal
votes, and resources can be taken from some and given to others by voting for
the transfer. This is a naked truth, and it is not pretty. It is perhaps only
human, but insincere, to prettify it by pretending that the net effect of
these enforced transfers is to make us all wealthier and safer. (26) Notes (1) Nozick, R., Anarchy,
State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974. (2) Rawls, J., A
Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. (3) There are countless examples of the
profound influence exercised by Rawls on contemporary political philosophers.
As far as the Italian context is concerned, anyway, at least we should
mention the work of Salvatore Veca and Sebastiano Maffettone. See,
for example, Veca, La società giusta, Milano: Il
Saggiatore, 1982, and Questioni di giustizia.
Corso di filosofia politica, Torino: Einaudi, 1991; Maffettone, Valori comuni, Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1989, and Etica pubblica, Milano: Il Saggiatore,
2001. (4) Rothbard, M.N., For
a New (5) On the first steps of the Libertarian
movement in the (6) Prominent works in the contemporary
minarchist stream of libertarianism are Rasmussen,
D.B., & Den Uyl, D., (7) Building on (8) Machan, “Revisiting Anarchism and Government”. (9) Rothbard, Man,
Economy, and State. A treatise on economic principles, (10) Leoni, B., “Mito e realtà dei
monopoli” (1965), now in La sovranità
del consumatore, Prefazione di Ricossa,
S., Roma: Ideazione, 1997, pp.129-65. On Leoni, see Masala, A., Il
liberalismo di Bruno Leoni, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003. (11) Salin, P., “Cartels as Efficient Productive
Structures”, The Review of Austrian
Economics, vol. 9, n.2, 1996, pp. 29-42. See also Salin, La concurrence,
(12) A point on which (13) Nozick, Anarchy,
State, and Utopia, p.151. (14) de Jasay, A., “Justice”, in Justice and Its Surroundings, (15) de Jasay, “Slicing the Cake Nobody Baked”, in Justice and Its Surroundings,
pp.186-98. (16) We are well aware that such a
definition would imply that it is impossible to classify as libertarian those
free-market economists who still theorize and apply Utilitarian positivist methodology,
including most of the so-called “Chicago School of Economics”. (17) See The Journal of Libertarian Studies, vol. 1, n.1, now available on
line at: http://www.mises.org/jlsdisplay.asp. (18) See Benson,
B., The (19) See, especially, de Jasay, Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study of the Public Goods Problem, (20) See Narveson,
J., The Libertarian Idea, (21) See Veatch, H.B., Human
Rights: Fact or Fancy?, (22) See de
Jasay, The State (1985),
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1997); Choice,
Contract, and Consent. A Restatement of Liberalism, London: IEA, 2004; Against Politics. On government, anarchy,
and order, London: Routledge, 1997; and Justice and Its Surroundings. (23) On the charge of “Constructivism”,
see Antiseri, D., “Ludwig von
Mises and Friedrich von Hayek: Il nazismo ha radici socialiste”, in Colombatto, E. & Mingardi, A., ed. by, Il coraggio della libertà. Saggi in onore di Sergio Ricossa,
Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2002, pp.63-75. For an account of the incompatibility of Classical
Liberalism and a constructivist approach, see the classic Hayek, F.A., The Counter-Revolution of Science. Studies on the Abuse of Reason
(1952), Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1980) and The Fatal Conceit. The Errors of Socialism, Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1991. On the topic, see also Infantino, L., Individualism
in Modern Thought, London: Routledge, 1998, Ignorance and Liberty, London: Routledge, 2002; Martino, A., “Liberalismo e
costruttivismo”, in Semplicemente
liberale, Macerata: Liberilibri, 2004; and Ricossa, La fine
dell’economia, Milano: Sugarco, 1986. (24)
See, for example, Block, W.
& Di Lorenzo, T.J., “The Calculus of Consent rivisitato: il
‘liberalismo’ di James Buchanan e Gordon Tullock”, in Colombatto & Mingardi,
ed. by, Il coraggio della libertà,
pp.77-93. (25) Piombini uses the locution
“left-libertarianism” to refer to those classical liberals or libertarian
anarchists that do not share a traditional (conservative) view in the matter
of personal morality. This is also the usage of Hoppe, Democracy. The
God That Failed. However, it is questionable if this is a proper use or
not. “Left-libertarians”, in contemporary political philosophy, are
especially those who (following Hillel Steiner) though accepting
self-ownership, refuse to recognize ownership of external goods as
legitimate, endorsing a version of the Lockean proviso with strong
egalitarian accents. See, for example, the recent Otsuka, M., Libertarianism
Without Inequality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. (26) Infra. |