REDUCING NORMS TO SUPEREGOIC EMOTIONS

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ABSTRACT
It is notoriously difficult to reduce norms to empirical phenomena. If they are defined in terms of normative language or emotions, the problem is how to distinguish normative from non-normative language or emotions, and this requires an independent concept of normativity. But normativity is as difficult to reduce to empirical phenomena as norms are. A solution may be to make the psychoanalytical assumption that human animals develop normativity through their interactions with their caregivers, whom they conceive to have features that monotheisms ascribe to God. Normative or superegoic emotions can be understood as the unconscious reexperience of early infantile interactions with one’s own “godlike” caregiver. Based on this approach, three types of normative emotions can be distinguished: first, sadistic superegoic emotions, where individuals unconsciously reexperience their caregiver as authorizing their reactive aggression (anger), proactive aggression (indignation), and her displays of disgust (superegoic disgust); second, masochistic superegoic emotions, where one unconsciously reexperiences one’s own infantile experience of having hurt one’s own caregiver (guilt), or being disgusting to them (shame); and third, narcissistic emotions, including one’s unconscious reexperience of the infantile experience of believing to be able to measure up to the model represented by one’s caregiver. This approach raises the question of whether non-human animals can experience superegoic emotions. The answer depends on whether they underwent some form of primary socialization; if not, at most, forms of proto-normativity may be found in them such as unsocialized reactive aggression (proto-anger) and unsocialized proactive aggression (proto-indignation). The possibility for domesticated non-human animals to have superegoic emotions other than those found in human animals (para-guilt) is also discussed.

KEYWORDS
Norm, Child-Caregiver Interactions, Normative Emotions, Psychoanalysis, Superego

1. INTRODUCTION

During the 20th century, various legal philosophers and sociologists attempted to reduce norms to empirical phenomena or—which is the same—provided stipulative definitions for “norm” in terms of empirical phenomena. They realized that it is very difficult to define that term without employing no less obscure terms such as

¹Refer to the thinkers discussed in Fittipaldi 2016; a thinker that should also be considered in this regard is Jeremy Bentham (see Ferraro & Poggi 2012).
“ought to”, “should”, or “obligation”, as would be the case if the following definition was proposed:

A norm is the belief that one ought to behave in a certain way—always (categorical norms) or only under certain circumstances (hypothetical norms).

No less problematic is to state that an indicator of norms is normative language, i.e., employing normative or deontic expressions such as “ought”, “should”, “must”, and “That is wrong!” First, this approach does not allow one to trace norms among prelinguistic children and non-human animals. Second, and more importantly, this approach involves a petitio principii, as we may ask how we know that a term or a sentence is normative if we do not already have an independent criterion of normativity.¹

To avoid such problems, it is important to define “norm” without any “normative” terms. In this study, I will reduce norms to normative emotions. Moreover, “normative emotions” will be understood as emotions that emerge or are reshaped through infantile child-caregiver interactions. Accordingly, the petitio principii that bedevils other approaches will be avoided.

Notions proposed by Sigmund Freud, other psychoanalysts, and Jean Piaget, whose ideas I regard as compatible with psychoanalysis, will be primarily elaborated in this study. When necessary, other psychologists’ ideas, provided they are compatible with psychoanalysis, will be considered.

This approach will also make it possible to improve the definitions of “norm” that Theodor Geiger and Niklas Luhmann, two sociologists of law, proposed.

Let me briefly discuss these definitions.

Geiger’s (1947/1964) definition has some shortcomings that are not necessary to be discussed here.² An improved definition is given below:

The existence of a norm n amounts

1. to the sufficiently widespread performance of a type of behavior b, and
2. (α) to the sufficiently widespread unpleasant social reaction—or negative sanction—toward those who do not perform it and/or (β) to the sufficiently

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¹Throughout “behave” and “behavior” are used to refer to actions and abstentions alike.

²This definition is inspired by Pattaro 2005 (94). To be sure, by conjecturing that norms may have a relation with obsessive-compulsive disorders (383), Pattaro suggested a solution that is not incompatible with the one proposed in this study.

³This problem manifests itself in full if we consider that seemingly normative sentences can also be used in a non-normative way (e.g., “John should have arrived by now”) and seemingly descriptive sentences (e.g., “We don’t do that here”; cf. Tomasello 2019: 122) may be used in a normative way.


⁵If one wishes, “the existence” can be removed. I included it to ensure a more natural sentence.
widespread pleasant social reaction—or positive sanction—toward those who perform it."

In my opinion, the principal flaw of this (improved) definition is that it does not make it possible to distinguish between normative and non-normative\(^7\) behaviors.

There is a considerable difference between acting in a certain way (i) because we believe that we “ought” to act that way and (ii) because we are afraid of a negative social reaction and/or strive for a positive social reaction.

Niklas Luhmann provided a way to preserve this distinction by elaborating on Galtung (1959), and defined norms as “*counterfactually stabilized* behavioral expectations” (Luhmann 1972/1985: 33, emphasis in the original).

In brief, whether an expectation is cognitive or normative depends on whether, if frustrated by facts, it is subject to change.

Let us consider this example. Ego has an expectation to be able to reserve a table at a restaurant, but that expectation is frustrated by that restaurant’s being fully reserved. Her expectation is *cognitive* if she peace-mindedly changes her arrangements and looks for another restaurant. Instead, it is *normative* if she, say, starts claiming that she is a regular customer and insists to be given a table reserved for others.

Unfortunately, Luhmann did not provide details about the psychological nature of “counterfactual stabilizations”.\(^8\) Consequently, I will attempt to combine Luhmann’s definition with a psychoanalytically modified version of Geiger’s definition.

Notably:
1. I will (further) improve Geiger’s concept of reaction by including not only positive sanctions but also sanctions in the sense of “official approval”.
2. I will turn Geiger’s social sanctions into superegoic ones (a move he probably would not have accepted).

Accordingly, I will be able to redefine Luhmann’s normative expectations in the terms the following superegoic expectations: anger-, indignation-, disgust-, guilt-, shame-, and pride-backed expectations.

This change will enable me to empirically define “norm”. It will also make it possible to define “ought to”\(^9\), “obligation”, and “right”.

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\(^7\)“Type of behavior” should be understood so as to select behaviors performed only by certain social actors. Basically, my improvements are aimed at considering also categorical norms and positive sanctions.

\(^8\)I prefer using “non-normative” rather than “teleological” because proactive aggression, which I understand as a normative or proto-normative behavior, may involve means-end thinking. My distinction between normative and non-normative behaviors is dependent on the definition of normative behavior rather than on the definition of non-normative, or teleological behavior.”

\(^9\)“Throughout, I will refer to Ego as she and Alter and Tertius as he.”

\(^10\)To be sure, he provided obscure sociological explanations.

\(^11\)For clarity, henceforth “should” will be used only to form the present subjunctive.
Preliminarily, it is also necessary to anticipate that my proposal will be premised on the following hypotheses:

H.1. Normative emotions emerge because of or are reshaped by one’s early childhood interactions with their caregivers and involve the unconscious reexperience of those interactions.

H.2. Children experience respect toward their caregivers, which I understand to be a blend of love and fear (Bovet 1925/1928: 46; Piaget 1932/1948: 321).

H.3. Children conceive their caregivers in the fashion monotheisms conceive God (Piaget 1932/1948: 380), i.e., as an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and eternal being.

H.4. The prestige children ascribe to their caregivers also characterizes superegoic emotions, which are experienced as somewhat “sacred”.

In Section 2, anger, indignation, and disgust, i.e., sadistic superegoic emotions are discussed. Section 3 is devoted to guilt, shame, and pride, i.e., masochistic and narcissistic superegoic emotions. Finally, in Section 4, two issues are considered: first, what these emotions share that allows them to be grouped together as “normative” or “superegoic”, terms which are used synonymously, and second, whether these emotions or their forerunners can be traced among non-human animals.

2. ANGER, INDIGNATION, AND DISGUST

In this section, anger and indignation, which I regard as forms of normative aggression, and (superegoic) disgust are discussed. Because of the importance attached to anger and indignation, this section is much longer than subsequent sections.

I am of the opinion that anger and indignation should be regarded as forms of socialized aggression, notably as results of primary socialization. In reconstructing the socialization of aggression—and pace Sigmund Freud—I will not in any way assume that aggression is a unitary phenomenon; instead, I will attempt to make a

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12Henceforth, I will mostly use “caregiver” in the singular form. Further, I will refer to the child as she and the caregiver as he. These choices carry no theoretical implications.

13Freud made a similar point in (1932/1981) where he stated that adults “exhale[ ] the image [of their father] into a deity” (163). Throughout, I will employ the expression “godlike caregiver”. However, it would be more accurate to say that it is the monotheistic God that is caregiver-like, rather than the other way around. For this reason, “godlike” will always be written in quotes.

14I am aware that there are normative emotions other than those discussed here. Further possible normative emotions are derision and admiration. Due to space limitations, I will confine myself to those mentioned in the text.

15Although authors use the term “moralistic aggression”. I have chosen not to use “moralistic” as I regard anger as jural aggression (see below).
distinction between anger and indignation by elaborating on Richard Wrangham’s version of the distinction between reactive and proactive aggression.

Wrangham understands reactive aggression as “a response to a threat or frustrating event, with the goal being only to remove the provoking stimulus” (2017/2018: 2). On the other hand, he understands proactive aggression as “a purposeful planned attack with an external or internal reward as a goal, [that] is characterized by attention to a consistent target, and often by a lack of emotional arousal” (Ibid.). It is noteworthy that he offers the examples not only of premeditated homicide and ritual sacrifice but also of lynching, bullying, stalking, hazing, torture (Ibid. and 2019: 246), that is, forms of aggression often performed for their own sake. Therefore, I will simplify Wrangham’s concept of proactive aggression and understand it as any form of aggression other than reactive aggression. In other words, I will understand proactive aggression as any form of aggression not performed as a response to a threat or frustrating event; a form of aggression the reward for which may be exclusively the “fun” of being violent against a sentient being.16

One of first things a caregiver usually teaches his children is to restrain their otherwise unrestrained aggressiveness, whether active or proactive.17

The manner in which caregivers effect the passage from unrestrained aggressiveness to restrained, or socialized aggressiveness makes it possible to provide an empirical definition for (jural) “norm”, as well as an empirical definition for “right”, (jural) “obligation”, and (jural) “prohibition”.

Because of her caregiver’s implicit and explicit teachings or simply because the child regards her caregiver as a “godlike” model, she learns that it is safe to be aggressive only:

i. in certain ways (e.g., verbally) and

ii. under certain circumstances.

In this study, I will focus on (ii).

As a consequence of her interactions with her caregiver, a child may learn that he tolerates or backs her reactive and proactive aggression:

16I do not rule out that future research might show that proactive aggression is not a unitary phenomenon. What I rely on is the idea that this phenomenon (of set phenomena) is different from reactive aggression.

17To the best of my knowledge, the first to notice this phenomenon was Adam Smith who instead of “aggression” and “emotion” used “anger” and “passion”, respectively (Smith 1790/1853: 203).

18“Jural” is used here to refer to imperative-attributive phenomena, i.e., phenomena involving an “obligation” and a correlative “right”. The term “imperative-attributive” suggests that, in jural phenomena, one’s “conscience” at once commands (imperat) a behavior and ascribes (attribuit) it to others. For example, a caregiver’s “conscience” may command him to help financially his child and ascribe that behavior to her, as her right. With respect to the adjective “moral”, I use it to refer to purely imperative phenomena such as one’s “conscience” commanding to help a needy person without ascribing to them that behavior as their right. In doing so, I am following Petrażycki 1907 and 1909–1910.
ii.i. *only* against *certain* threats or frustrations\(^9\) and, if at all,

ii.ii. *only* against *certain* cognitively salient people and/or behaviors.

This socialization process results in children and subsequently adolescents and adults learning:

1. to react to most frustrations and cognitively salient people and behaviors by restraining their aggressiveness;

2. not to become aggressive in any way if certain types of circumstances occur (e.g., if somebody passes them on the highway or is dressed in a cognitively salient way); and

3. to experience regret and/or despair rather than become aggressive if certain types of circumstances occur (e.g., if one’s love is unrequited).\(^{20}\)

Due to the socialization of aggressiveness, two types of aggression get selected:

α. socialized frustration-related aggression, which I will refer to as “anger” and

β. socialized frustration-unrelated aggression, which I will refer to “indignation”.

Therefore, while indignation is a gratuitous form aggression, anger is not, as it is always related to the experience of a frustration.

Anger and indignation may be considered as socialized reactive aggression and socialized proactive aggression, respectively. It should be further observed that, from this perspective, reactive aggression is not simply associated with anger (contra Wrangham 2017/2018: 2, emphasis added); when socialized, reactive aggression is anger.

2.1. Anger

Anger emerges when the child learns that her caregiver tolerates or encourages her reactive aggression in the event of certain frustrations or in the event of certain threats to certain objects\(^{21}\) that are important to her.

Although the types of threats or frustrations that may elicit anger vary dramatically across cultures, most socialized children learn *not* to repress aggression:

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\(^{9}\)In accordance with Wrangham 2017-2018 (2), I do not distinguish here between threat- and frustration-related aggression. I regard both as reactive, and henceforth, I will use “threat” and “frustration” interchangeably.

\(^{20}\)I am aware that aggression in the event of unrequited love is a tragically widespread (masculine) phenomenon. However, males who react otherwise do exist, and I believe this is a remarkable phenomenon from the perspectives of both cultural and biological evolution. I cannot assess to what extent this is the result of evolution or socialization.

\(^{21}\)I am using “object” to refer to both animate beings and inanimate things, including animate beings’ behaviors.
- against threats to *their* bodily parts;
- against threats to certain objects that are important to *them*, such as *their* clothes or *their* toys; and
- in the event of frustration to such expectations as that to receive *their* equal or, more generally, “fair” share in resources acquired in a joint effort.\(^{22}\)

It is of importance to note that anger, unlike indignation, which is discussed in Section 2.2, is *not* gratuitous. Anger is always elicited:
- by the threat to an object one experiences as *her own* (e.g., one’s hand, one’s toy, one’s brother) or
- when the expectation of receiving an object one already experiences as *her own* is frustrated (e.g., one’s reserved table at a restaurant, the money owed by one’s creditor, or one’s bathtub fixed by a plumber).

A connection to an object one already experiences as *their own* can be traced also in the case of Alter’s “mere” expectation of receiving from Ego a sum of money in a fully executory contract; that is, a contract that neither Ego nor Alter has yet performed.\(^{21}\) In such a contract, Ego’s non-performance does not cause Alter the *loss of his own performance* (which would be the case in a partly executed contract where Alter had already performed). Ego is simply causing Alter to lose *his* (Alter’s) *hope to exchange* his (Alter’s) performance for her (Ego’s) counter-performance (e.g., a house Alter really wishes to buy from Ego). However, this fact does not prevent Alter from already experiencing Ego’s counter-performance or its object as his own.

Due to its frustration-relatedness, anger naturally involves the experience of my-ness, your-ness, our-ness, her-ness, his-ness, their-ness, i.e., the experience of *ownness*. I will return to this issue shortly.

Prior to doing that, it is necessary to introduce the concept of an anger-backed expectation and put it in relation with Luhmann’s definition of norms in terms of expectations.

Over time, children whose frustration-related aggressiveness has been socialized through their interactions with their “godlike” caregivers may:

1. *typify* what they can safely be reactively aggressive to and
2. *shift their cognitive focus* from the types of events that make them safely angry to those that do not make them angry.

\(^{22}\)With this example, I am not ruling out that proneness to this reaction may be genetically encoded and simply selected for non-repression by socialization (cf. Tomasello 2019: 236). However, it is crucial to consider that, if genetically encoded, this proneness may be completely eradicated through socialization, as often occurs in the socialization of slaves, especially in those societies where they are not treated in an overly harsh way.

\(^{21}\)I refer to the person who experiences anger as Alter because this will prove useful when summarizing the different types of normative expectations that may concern the very same behavior (see below, Table 1).
As a result, they may consciously start to expect the non-instantiation of certain types of anger-eliciting events.24

Thus:

α. an anger-eliciting type of action (e.g., being physically assaulted) may give rise to an anger-backed expectation concerning an abstention (not being physically assaulted), and

β. an anger-eliciting type of abstention (e.g., one’s not keeping a promise) may give rise to an anger-backed expectation concerning an action (one’s keeping a promise).

These normative expectations I refer to as anger-backed expectations.

The reconstruction of normative expectations in terms of anger-backed expectations (and of other superegoic expectations) makes it possible to cast light on Luhmann’s obscure concept of a “counterfactual stabilization”.

To employ the example I made above concerning the reservation at a restaurant, it is anger that makes Alter counterfactually insist that Ego, the restaurant owner, give him his table, rather than resignedly search for another restaurant.

This proposed reconstruction implies that anger-backed expectations can be also regarded as the jural expectations.

As noted previously, anger (and reactive aggression) always involves an experience of relatedness, or ownness. This holds also for other people’s obligations. Right-holders, as it were, own their duty-holders’ obligations or their objects. In the example I have employed, Alter experiences the table he reserved as his table. This means that anger-backed expectations are what the sense of right/entitlement can be reduced to. This is why, henceforth, I will use the terms “anger-backed expectation” and “jural expectation” interchangeably, and refer to the other superegoic expectations as “moral expectations”. More in general, all forms of sense of right/entitlement can be traced back to an experience of ownness and it is not the experience of ownness/ownership that is a form of experience of entitlement (or jural expectation), but all forms of experience of entitlement that are, ultimately, extensions of the experience of relatedness/ownness/ownership.

Another consequence of this reconstruction is that, unlike unsocialized reactive aggressiveness, socialized reactive aggressiveness involves a quasi-religious arousal.

Due to their early interactions with their caregivers, socialized children and subsequently adolescents and adults experience their jural expectations as somewhat “sacred”. This sacredness originates from these expectations being unconsciously

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24To be sure, both the typification of what makes one angry and the cognitive shift from what makes one angry to what would not make one angry may require a cultural process over several generations. To keep the discussion simple, I am discussing this process as though it were of a purely ontogenetic nature.

25A fully naturalized reconstruction of promising can be found in Fittipaldi (2021).

26In this study, “entitlement” and “right” are used as synonyms.
experienced as sanctioned by one’s God, namely, one’s caregiver. This holds also for “rights”, which I now turn to.

Over time, the existence of jural expectations may cause, at least in some cultures, the emergence of specific terms for the pseudo-concept of right, such as “right” (English), “rätt” (Swedish), and “δικαίωμα” (Modern Greek).

I employ the term “pseudo-concept” to refer to a concept that is unamenable to mental representation. A word that means a pseudo-concept or—which is the same—that has a pseudo-meaning is a hollow word.

To realize that “right” is a hollow word—and this holds also for “ought to”, “obligation”, “debt”, etc.—suffice it to try to think of the right to receive 100 euros from somebody. If we think (α) of a contract or (β) of 100 euros, we are not thinking of a right but of something else, namely, (α) of a way that right may have “come into being” or (β) of the object of that right.

The existence of hollow words may give rise to the illusion that we become angry because a right of ours has been infringed, rather than the other way around.

The opposite is true.

We experience some behavior as an infringement of a right because we have the disposition to become angry under certain circumstances rather than others. It is our disposition to become angry that leads to our construing, or experiencing those circumstances as infringements of rights.

In this connection, it is noteworthy that there may not be a term for “right” in the language(s) of some cultures. However, this fact does not imply that in such cultures anger-backed, or jural expectations do not exist.

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27 By “amenability to mental representation of a concept”, I mean one’s ability to represent to oneself a prototype of it. For example, the fact that “dog” stands for a concept amounts to one’s associating a “dog” to the representation of a prototype. Prototypes vary in accordance with people and their cultures. Many people, if asked to represent to themselves a dog, may think of a German shepherd. However, others may represent to themselves a pit bull or even a Yorkshire terrier. (On prototype linguistics, refer to Taylor 2003.)

28 I borrow the idea that “[t]he word ‘right’ is a hollow word and stands for nothing” from Olivecrona 1971 (252 and 184) who, in turn, borrowed it from Hägerström. I have adapted the terminology from Pataro 2016 who provides a detailed reconstruction of Hägerström’s ideas.

29 The fact that pseudo-concepts are not amenable to representation and that, if we need to represent them to ourselves, we often think of something else, explains why the etymology of some deontic words can be traced back (α) to the way their pseudo-referents supposedly come into being or (β) to the behaviors their meanings concern. An example of (α) is the English term “debt”, which originates from the Latin term “debitum”, which, in turn, originates from “de-habere”, lit. “to have [habere] (borrowed something) from [de] (somebody)”. An example of (β) is the Latin term for “debt”: “aes alienum”, lit., “others’ [alienum] copper [aes]” in which copper is a crucial component of the behavior Alter expects of Ego. A third way these terms may possibly emerge is as metaphorical descriptions of Ego’s experience of being constrained by Alter’s disposition to become angry should Ego not act in a certain way. For example, the Latin term obligatio stems from the verb ligare, meaning “to tie”: to have an obligation is to be tied.
In Classical Latin, which is among the languages that have no term for “right”, “ius” could be used only to mean “law” (see D’Ors 1983: 280). However, this fact did not prevent ancient Romans from becoming angry and having jural expectations, which sometimes resulted in conflicts. It is in the attempt to solve these conflicts that Roman jurists created what is referred to as “Roman Law”.

This example illustrates the importance of tracing “rights” back to observable non-linguistic phenomena rather than rely on hollow words, which, to reiterate, may not even exist in a given culture.

Based on this proposal, we can either replace “right” with “anger-backed expectation” or understand “right” as a hollow word that means an illusion caused by “anger-backed expectations”.

There is at least one reason why replacing “right” with “anger-backed expectation” is not advisable. The emergence of hollow words such as “right”, as distinct from terms meaning “anger”, “rage”, and the like, is per se a phenomenon worth investigating. This difficult empirical problem may easily be overlooked if “right” is replaced with “jural or “anger-backed expectation”. However, to keep the discussion simple, here I will replace “right” (and “entitlement”) with “jural or “anger-backed expectation”, and I will do the same also with other hollow words.

At any rate, both approaches (understanding “right” as a hollow word and treating “right” as a synonym of “anger-backed expectation”) share the advantage of making it possible to trace forms of jural conflict and jural coordination in cultures whose languages do not have a term for “right”.

To show that, it is first necessary to introduce two concepts concerning Ego’s and Alter’s jural expectations:

1. Ego’s “acknowledgment” of Alter’s jural expectation is here understood as Ego’s having a jural expectation that is complementary to that of Alter.

2. Tertius’ identification with Alter and “sharing” his jural expectation is here understood as Tertius’ having a jural expectation that is concordant with that of Alter.

In case (2), Tertius has the sympathetic disposition to become angry should Ego frustrate Alter’s expectation.

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30 Whether the Ancient Greek terms δικαίωμα and ἐξουσία can sometimes be translated with “right” is an open question. The main meaning of these terms seems to be “rightful action” and “permission”, respectively (δικαίωμα stems from δίκαιος, “just”, “fair”, while ἐξουσία stems from ἔξεστι, lit. “it is excepted”).

31 An example of “ius” used to mean “right” can be found below, Section 2.2.

32 It should be borne in mind that unlike illusions such as mirages, rights cannot be the objects of representation. This is why I have stated that “right” stands for a pseudo-concept.

33 On this subject, see Fittipaldi 2012.

34 I am borrowing this conceptual apparatus and, to some extent, its terminology from Frankel 2002 (105), who traces concordant expectations to forms of identification with the aggressor. Due to space limitations, I do not discuss this issue in the present study.
Since it is unnatural to say that Ego and Tertius have jural *expectations* that are, respectively, complementary to and concordant with Alter’s jural expectation, for the sake of terminological consistency I will often replace “expectation” with “disposition,” and say that Ego and Tertius have jural *dispositions* that are, respectively, complementary to and concordant with Alter’s jural *disposition*.

If Ego does not have a disposition that is complementary to that of Alter, which is quite frequent, a conflict between the two may occur. I refer to this type of conflict as *jural conflict*.

The conceptualization proposed here implies that for the existence of a jural conflict incompatible jural dispositions are necessary, namely, jural expectations that cannot be contemporarily satisfied (or a jural expectation concerning a certain behavior and the absence of a complementary jural disposition concerning it). What is not necessary is the pseudo-concept of right or some term referring to it.

On the other hand, this conceptualization implies that anger-backed dispositions also play a crucial role with respect to forms of *jural coordination*.

With respect to this issue, I am following Petrażycki (1909-1910) who held that, although “law” is the main cause of conflicts between humans, it also plays two coordinative functions, namely, an organizational function (e.g., making “states” possible) and a distributive function (e.g., making “markets” possible).

Not even these forms of coordination require the pseudo-concept of right and some term meaning it.

Due to space limitations, I will confine myself to a brief discussion of markets.

The way jural dispositions make markets possible is aptly summarized by Ekkehart Schlicht (1998). Unfortunately, he emphasizes the role played by “entitlements” and “obligations” without realizing that what he is actually depicting is the role played by anger-backed dispositions:

The effect of entitlements and obligations is most easily understood by looking at commonplace transactions. Consider ... a taxi ride in an unfamiliar town. A person enters a taxi cab and tells the driver where to go. Upon arrival the taxi driver points to the taximeter and indicates the fare. The customer pays ... [and] leaves[. T]he taxi disappears. Neither party expects to meet the other again, and no-one thinks about the episode any further ... . ... Why do both parties honor the contract? The passenger, for his part may consider leaving the taxi without paying, as he has been brought to the place where he wanted to go. He may fear, however, that this would *infltriate* the taxi driver. As the driver appears to be a strong and determined person, this appears too high a risk, and the passenger decides to pay.

However, after having handed over the money, *nothing has changed in the mutual bargaining position*: the taximeter reading is still the same, the physique of the taxi driver appears as threatening as before, and the passenger still has cash in his pocket. So why does the taxi driver not insist that the passenger pay again, and why shouldn’t the passenger comply if he did before?
The taxi driver may think that such a demand would infuriate the passenger. The passenger could resist, and could consider legal action. So he is content with what he has obtained and drives away. [Schlicht 1998: 29 f., emphases added]

It is not entitlements and obligations that make this interaction possible, but rather:

- the passenger’s anger-backed expectation not to be asked to pay twice, along with her complementary anger-backed disposition to pay the taxi driver, and
- the taxi driver’s anger-backed expectation that the passenger pay, along with his complementary anger-backed disposition not to ask the passenger to pay twice.

Focusing on anger has a further advantage. It makes it possible to realize that it is not true, as claimed by Schlicht, that “after having handed over the money, nothing has changed in the mutual bargaining position” (see the above quotation) of the passenger and the taxi driver. After the payment, should the taxi driver ask for a second payment, he would have to deal, as it were, with a “stronger” passenger because, after the payment, the passenger has a disposition to become aggressive she previously had not. The complementary is true for the taxi driver: Until the passenger pays, the taxi driver has a disposition to become aggressive, which ceases to exist as soon as the passenger’s payment takes place. The payment effects, as it were, the handing over of a weapon (the disposition to become aggressive) from the taxi driver to the passenger.

I can now formalize an empirical reduction of “jural norm” and “right” in the following manner:

$$\neg b_n \rightarrow (\text{ANGER})_m. (\neg b_n).$$

The above expression should be read in the following way: The performance of non-$b^\epsilon$ by Ego causes anger in Alter at behavior non-$b$ on the part of Ego.\(^37\)

\(^35\)To avoid misunderstanding, it should be stressed that, here, the normative (or, more precisely jural) phenomena (i) are the passenger’s disposition to become angry should the taxi driver ask to be paid twice, (ii) the taxi driver’s disposition to become angry should the passenger refuse to pay, and (iii) the passenger’s and (iv) taxi driver’s complementary dispositions to those dispositions. If the passenger and the taxi driver abstain from, respectively, refusing to pay and asking to be paid twice solely because they fear the other’s anger, theirs are not normative phenomena but rather non-normative, or teleological phenomena (cf., above, fn. 8).

\(^36\)As for legal action, Schlicht only mentions it in respect to the passenger, who Schlicht surmises might sue the taxi driver, should the latter ask for a second payment. I do not know of any legal system in which a person can be sued for asking for a second payment. Schlicht is probably thinking of an extortion, which might involve an intervention by the police and then a criminal trial. As for the situation where a taxi driver sues a passenger for not paying, Schlicht does not even mention it.

\(^37\)“Non-$b^\epsilon$”, or “$\neg b^\epsilon$”, should be understood as “empirically incompatible with behavior $b$”.

\(^38\)It should be observed that it is not the non-performance of $b$ on the part of Ego that causes anger in Alter but Alter’s perception or belief that Ego does or did not perform $b$. Motivationally, external reality can act on human beings only as far as it is psychically processed. This point was elaborated systematically by Petrażycki (1909-1910).
A jural norm may be located:
1. within Alter’s psyche and concern Ego’s behavior;
2. within Ego’s psyche, concern Ego’s own behavior, and amount to a complementary anger-backed disposition; and/or
3. within Tertius’ psyche, concern Ego’s behavior, and amount to a concordant anger-backed disposition.

I can now show that this approach also makes it possible to empirically define “(jural) obligation” and “(jural) prohibition”.

Jural obligations can be reduced in the following manner:
\[ \neg \exists x \text{Ego} \rightarrow \text{ANGER}_{\text{Alter}}(\neg \exists x \text{Ego}) \].

Abstention from action \( x \) on the part of Ego causes anger in Alter at abstention from \( x \) on the part of Ego.

As for jural prohibitions, they can be reduced as follows:
\[ \exists x \text{Ego} \rightarrow \text{ANGER}_{\text{Alter}}(\exists x \text{Ego}) \].

Action \( x \) on the part of Ego causes anger in Alter at action \( x \) on the part of Ego”.

Similar to jural expectations, jural obligations involve a cognitive shift from the abstention that causes anger to the action that would not cause it.

The reason jural obligations involve a cognitive shift while jural prohibitions do not is that:
- jural prohibitions concern actions that elicit anger, while
- jural obligations concern actions that prevent anger.

From a logical standpoint, obligatory actions can be turned into prohibited abstentions (and vice versa). However, this does not touch on the psychological fact that we naturally focus more on actions than abstentions,\(^{40}\) and therefore, it is more natural for us to speak about obligations when the anger-elicitor is an abstention, such as not keeping a promise, than when it is an action, such as assaulting people. This is why we speak of the obligation to keep promises but we do not speak of the obligation to abstain from assaulting people (at most, we speak of the right to bodily integrity).

2.2. Indignation

As noted previously, unlike anger, indignation is gratuitous. It emerges as a result of the child learning that there are types of circumstances in which in which her caregiver will tolerate or approve of her becoming aggressive, even in the absence of any form of threat or frustration.

\(^{39}\) \( x \) is used to refer to actions strictly understood.

\(^{40}\) Cf. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1996 (42) and Clark & Clark 1977 (538).
With respect to indignation, people employ the *cognitive salience* of some beings' features or behaviors as a *pretext* to exert aggression toward them. The salient features of those beings or behaviors may be extremely diverse, ranging from having an uncommon sexual behavior, such as homosexuality, to being an intelligent woman, as may have been the case in many witch hunts.

One may ask why human beings take other beings’ cognitive salience as a pretext to be aggressive against them. In other words, why do humans engage in moral sadism? I cannot discuss this issue here. It is sufficient to repeat that indignation is here understood as socialized proactive aggression, and unsocialized proactive aggression may perfectly be an *innate* phenomenon to be explained evolutionarily.

What is key here is that the *socialization* of proactive aggression is not innate. Therefore, *socialized* proactive aggression, namely, indignation is not innate either. A consequence of this is that, with their “godlike” prestige, caregivers teach their children that gratuitous aggression can be safely exerted against certain targets, *and only them*. I am not aware of any study showing that non-human primates’ proactive aggression can be at all socialized and, if this is the case, to what extent its targets can be redirected.

Indignation-backed expectations/dispositions, or norms may be formalized in the following manner:

$\neg b_{\text{Eg}} \rightarrow \text{INDIGNATION}_{\text{Tertius}}(\neg b_{\text{Eg}})$.

The above expression may be read in the following way: Behavior $\neg b$ on the part of Ego causes indignation in Tertius at behavior $\neg b$ on the part of Ego. The norm concerns Ego’s behavior but exists only within Tertius’ psyche. There cannot be anything like a complementary indignation-backed expectation within Ego. At most, Ego may experience shame or guilt (see below).

Also in the case of indignation, by using $x$ and $\neg x$, prohibitions and obligations, respectively, can be reduced to dispositions to experience indignation:

$x_{\text{Eg}} \rightarrow \text{INDIGNATION}_{\text{Tertius}}(x_{\text{Eg}})$

$\neg x_{\text{Eg}} \rightarrow \text{INDIGNATION}_{\text{Tertius}}(\neg x_{\text{Eg}})$

This hypothesis elaborates on Freud’s “narcissism of small differences” (Freud 1929/1981: 114). Due to space limitations, I cannot discuss the difference between being indignant at a certain person’s behavior and being indignant at a certain type of person per se.

Interestingly, often indignation involves the imbalance of power, which Wrangham (2019: 225) describes. In comparison to angry people, indignant people are less probable to “act out” on their indignation if other people do not share it. Typically, witch hunts, stonings, and lynchings involve a considerable imbalance of power.

To avoid misunderstanding, it should be stressed that, once learned, an adolescent and subsequently an adult may become capable of unconsciously experiencing her caregiver’s sanction of aggression even against targets diametrically opposed to those her caregiver would have approved of. For example, a child raised by a fascist caregiver can become a gratuitously violent communist or vice versa.
Two phenomena that at first glance may appear to be forms of anger but should rather be considered as forms of indignation should be now discussed.

The first phenomenon is where Tertius *pretends* to be identifying with Alter’s anger at something Ego did to him. If Tertius is only taking as a pretext what Ego did to Alter, we are dealing with a form of indignation, not of anger. This is typically the case of those who participate in the lapidation of an adulterer not because they sympathize with the cheated-on spouse, but simply for the sake of being cruel, that is, for the sake of releasing their aggression against a safe target (the adulterer).

The second phenomenon concerns many cases of revenge.

For revenge to be a form of reactive aggression, it is not sufficient for the revenge-taker to have *previously* experienced a form of reactive aggression against their victim. Rather, it is necessary that the revenge-taker still experiences it during the act of revenge. If this is not the case, then we are not dealing with anger-backed revenge, or revenge proper, but with a form of indignation-backed revenge, or pseudo-revenge.

One could ask whether it is possible to square my approach with Wrangham’s contention that “acts of revenge are not necessarily reactive and in fact are unlikely to be so, given that revenge typically involves planning” (2017-2018: 2). The difference between my approach and that of Wrangham is terminological. I assume that Wrangham would rather employ “revenge proper” for what I have referred to as “pseudo-revenge” and vice versa.

The reason I prefer to employ “revenge proper” to refer to the revenge in which the revenge-taker still experiences anger is that the expression “right to take revenge” is sometimes utilized (e.g., *Recht zur Rache, ius ultionis*). If “right” is employed to refer to illusions that are generated by anger-backed, or jural expectations, consistency requires that revenge be understood as a form of frustration-related aggression.

Finally, it should be observed that this reconstruction implies that reactive and proactive aggression may *contemporarily* cause the same act. If this should turn out to be biologically impossible, I should conclude that revenge is always a form of indignation and that the reason “right” is used with respect to revenge is that what should now be referred to as *revenge proper* (due to a necessary terminological change) originates from one’s *previous* experience of anger at the victim. In this case, the term “pseudo-revenge” should be used to refer to instances where the revenge-taker *never* experienced anger.

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44 These terms can be found, for example, in Meiers 1767 (§ 50: 94).
2.3. Disgust

Paul Rozin and April E. Fanlon, by elaborating on some ideas of the Hungarian-American psychoanalyst Andras Angyal (1941), define disgust as “[r]evulsion at the prospect of (oral) incorporation of an offensive object” (1987: 23).

Disgust may also be a normative phenomenon (cf. e.g., Rozin 1999 and Haidt et al. 1997).

To the best of my knowledge, the question whether in human animals non-normative disgust is innate or rather emerges by virtue of early childhood interactions remains unsettled. However, it is not necessary to answer this question to explain normative, or superegoic disgust. Whether or not non-superegoic disgust is innate, superegoic disgust definitely emerges as being reshaped by primary socialization.

An important component of children’s socialization amounts to teaching them to control their disgust. For example, a caregiver may tolerate the fact that his child does not eat broccoli but may not tolerate her display of disgust, especially in the form of an actual or pretended urge to vomit at prospect of eating them.

However, the child also learns that there are situations where it is safe to show disgust. This may occur also with respect to objects that cannot conceivably be incorporated, for example, music. In the case of normative, or superegoic disgust, one unconsciously experiences one’s display of disgust as sanctioned by one’s “god-like” caregiver. This phenomenon may occur also with regard to types of food that are regarded as taboo in a given culture (pork, for the adherents to some religions) or subculture (meat, for the adherents to vegetarianism).

The way disgust works is similar to indignation:

\[-b_{\text{ego}} \rightarrow \text{DISGUST}_{\text{norm}}(-b_{\text{ego}})\]

This expression should be read in the following way: Behavior \(-b\) on the part of Ego causes disgust in Tertius at behavior \(-b\) on the part of Ego. Similar to indignation, although the norm is within Tertius’s psyche, it concerns a person other than Tertius: Ego. Depending on whether \(b\) is an action strictly understood or an abstinence from it, we are dealing with a disgust-backed prohibition or obligation.

I will briefly return to disgust below, when I will discuss shame.

3. GUILT, SHAME, AND PRIDE

In this Section I will discuss guilt, shame, and pride.

Unlike indignation and disgust, where the norm is located within a being (Tertius) other than its addressee (Ego), in the case of guilt, shame, and pride, the norm is located precisely within its addressee.
Furthermore, while anger, indignation, and disgust are forms of unconsciously sanctioned aggression (if broadly understood, as to comprise also disgust), with respect to guilt, shame, and pride, we are dealing with forms of internal sanctions. While guilt and shame are internal negative sanctions, pride is a form of internal positive sanction.

But this is where the similarities between guilt, shame, and guilt end. I will discuss them in Subsections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.

3.1 Guilt

From a psychoanalytic perspective, guilt emerges when the child causes her caregiver some form of pain and/or distress.

The child loves and fears her “godlike” caregiver; she is also terrified of losing the love of a person on whom she depends entirely. If, by empathizing with him, she realizes that he is experiencing some pain or distress because of something she did, she may become terrified at the idea of losing his love and bitterly regret her actions. Guilt is the unconscious reexperience of this terrifying experience.

Once socialized, children and subsequently adolescents and adults may experience guilt also with respect to animate beings other than their caregivers. However, their experience is very painful precisely because of the way they experienced their caregivers when they were still unsocialized children.

Based on this conceptualization, a guilt-backed expectation/disposition or norm may be conceptualized as follows:

\[ \neg b \rightarrow \text{GUILT}_{\text{ego}}(\neg b) \]

This expression may be read in the following way: Behavior \( \neg b \) on the part of Ego causes guilt in Ego for behavior \( \neg b \) on the part of Ego.

A guilt-backed obligation or prohibition, depending on whether \( b \) is an action (\( \lambda \)) or an abstention (\( \neg \lambda \)), is present:

\[ \neg \lambda \rightarrow \text{GUILT}_{\text{ego}}(\neg \lambda) \]
\[ \lambda \rightarrow \text{GUILT}_{\text{ego}}(\lambda) \]

In this respect, it is important to note two issues.

The first issue concerns the relation between guilt and love.

Although guilt presupposes love, it works in a different way.

When Ego does \( b \) for Tertius out of love,\(^46\) she does that because, by identifying with him, \( \text{she experiences his well-being as her own well-being} \). On the other hand, if Ego’s behavior is caused by a guilt-backed disposition, she performs \( b \) so as not

\(^{45}\)The reconstruction of guilt and shame offered here relies chiefly on Lewis (1971) and Tangney & Dearing (2002). The reconstruction of pride is an elaboration of Sandler (1960).

\(^{46}\)I am referring to the animate being with whom Ego interacts as Tertius because I use Alter to refer only to the “right-holder”.
to feel guilty if she does not perform b. In other words, while in the case of love Ego spontaneously pursues a sort of “altruistic selfishness”, or “selfish altruism”, in the case of guilt, this latter emotion works as an internal negative sanction, or as a sort of obstructive interference with Ego’s selfish plans.

The second issue is related to whether non-human animals can experience guilt. To the best of my knowledge, only forms of “para-guilt” can be observed among non-human animals. A brief examination of the manner in which de Waal discusses Lorenz’ ideas on this issue illustrates how the psychoanalytic approach may be helpful in this context:

Konrad Lorenz ... related how one of his dogs, Bully, accidentally bit [his] hand when he tried to break up one of fiercest dog fights he had ever seen. Even though Lorenz did not reprimand him and immediately tried to reassure and pet him, Bully was so upset by what he had done that he suffered a complete nervous breakdown. For days he was virtually paralyzed, and uninterested in food. He would lie on the rug breathing shallowly, an occasional deep sigh coming from his tormented soul. Anyone who had not seen the incident would have thought he had come down with a deadly disease. For weeks Bully remained extremely subdued. Lorenz noted that his dog had never bitten a person before, so could not have relied on previous experience to decide that he had done something wrong. Perhaps he had violated a natural taboo on inflicting damage to a superior, which normally (among members of his species) could have the worst imaginable consequences. If so, instead of saying that Bully felt guilty, it might be more appropriate that he expected punishment, perhaps, even expulsion from the pack. [de Waal 1996: 106]

As noted previously, guilt may be understood to be an adult’s unconscious reexperience of her infantile dread of losing her caregiver’s love. It should be added that this reexperience includes the fear of being punished by him and that the child, on the one hand, fears punishment also because she believes that it involves a form of love withdrawal and that, on the other hand, she construes love withdrawal as a form of punishment, no matter whether this is the way her caregiver understands it.

If the unconscious reexperience of the fear of punishment is the core of guilt, Bully was experiencing a form of para-guilt as far as the role of the infantile fear of love withdrawal was played by his fear of being expelled from the pack. If “transference” is understood to be the redirection of one’s way of experiencing one or more significant people/beings (e.g., one’s caregiver or the pack) to one or more entirely different people/beings (e.g., one’s doctor or a dog’s master), then a form of transference could be traced in Bully.

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47 I am using the prefix para- (from the Ancient Greek παρά, “beside”) because the pack cannot be regarded as a caregiver but in some respects can be compared to her.
3.2. Shame

Along with the inhibition of his child’s aggressiveness, one of the first things the caregiver tries to teach her is how to deal with her bodily wastes, saliva, bolus, and such (“toilet-training” or “habituation into pureness [Reinlichkeitsangewöhnung]”).

Toilet-training is effected chiefly through the caregiver’s displays of disgust.49 The experience of shame may be reconstructed as the unconscious reexperience of the infantile experience of being disgusting to one’s “godlike” caregiver.50 Quite literally, to be ashamed amounts to experiencing oneself like the bodily waste “par excellence” in the eyes of one’s God.

When children develop, this reexperience may be elicited by varied behaviors or events, which may be completely unrelated to their bodily wastes. Examples may range from making a solecism to wearing an outmoded tie.

The manner in which shame-backed expectations/dispositions, obligations, and prohibitions may be formalized is identical to the way in which I have formalized guilt-backed expectations, obligations, and prohibitions.

\[ \neg \text{Ego} \rightarrow \text{SHAME}_{\text{Ego}}(\neg \text{Ego}) \]

\[ \neg \text{X}_{\text{Ego}} \rightarrow \text{SHAME}_{\text{Ego}}(\neg \text{X}_{\text{Ego}}) \]

\[ \text{X}_{\text{Ego}} \rightarrow \text{SHAME}_{\text{Ego}}(\text{X}_{\text{Ego}}) \]

Finally, one may ask whether shame can be found in non-human animals; it cannot unless it can be shown that they can experience disgust and that non-human mothers use this emotion (also inadvertently) when interacting with their children.

3.3. Pride

Similar to guilt and shame, pride is an internal sanction. However, unlike guilt and shame, it is an internal reward, that is, a positive internal sanction.

As noted repeatedly, my approach is premised on the hypothesis that children conceive of their caregivers in the manner monotheisms conceive God. Consequently, no greater achievement exists for children than believing to be able to measure up to their “godlike” caregivers.

Pride may be explained as the unconscious reexperience of that belief.

Once we learn to experience pride, it can be elicited by the most diverse accomplishments, including some our caregivers knew nothing about or of which they would even have disapproved.

48 See Müller-Braunschweig 1922 (250).
49 Such displays may occur also unintentionally, as it is inevitable that the caregiver—even despite his best efforts—, sometimes displays disgust at his child (e.g., when changing her diaper).
50 On the role of disgusted faces in the socialization of children, see Lewis 1992 (110).
Pride-backed dispositions or norms, as well as pride-backed obligations and prohibitions can be formalized in the following manner:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{b}_{E}\rightarrow & \text{PRIDE}_E\text{b}_{E} \\
\text{x}_{E}\rightarrow & \text{PRIDE}_E\text{x} \\
\neg\text{x}_{E}\rightarrow & \text{PRIDE}_E\neg\text{x}
\end{align*}
\]

Unlike guilt- and shame-backed obligations, pride-backed obligations do not need a cognitive shift from an abstention to an action. As pride is a positive sanction, pride-backed obligations are concerned directly with the actions whose performances elicit pride. Rather, a cognitive shift can be observed in pride-backed prohibitions, where an abstention that elicits pride (e.g., not having sex outside wedlock) is transformed into a prohibition because we have a tendency to focus on actions rather than abstentions, as noted in Section 2.1.

I believe that much of what is referred to as “sense of duty” can be traced to pride-backed dispositions. One may hypothesize that at least some acts of heroism are performed out of the narcissistic wish to experience pride. Interestingly, often these acts are understated by suggesting they were nothing but the discharge of one’s duty. Such understatements are indexical of the transformation of pride-backed dispositions (i.e., strivings for the pleasant experiences of pride) into pride-backed obligations.

The same may be true for some religious people who perform difficult actions or abstentions, such as wearing sackcloth or abstaining from having sex outside the wedlock, which may be understood as the objects of a pride-backed obligation and a pride-backed prohibition, respectively.\(^{31}\)

Finally, one may ask whether non-human animals can have pride. They cannot unless it can be demonstrated that, when still dependent on their caregivers, they experienced them as having “godlike” features.

\(^{31}\)A reviewer correctly remarks that “the will to become godlike does not seem to be a common feature of the way historical monotheisms usually conceive of the relation between the believers and their god.” Indeed, in these religions, the pride a believer strives for is not the pride of becoming godlike, or even God. Such a striving would be rather regarded as a form of blasphemy or hybris. Believers strive to act and to be the way God wants. Why do monotheistic religions frame the relation between God and believers in this way? My conjecture is that there is a stage in which children learn that they will grow and become adults, that is, like their caregivers. Thus, the idea of becoming like one’s caregiver is perfectly plausible to them. On the other hand, children also learn that adults die, and death is something feared. In monotheisms (especially in the Christian and Islamic ones), what people expect of God is to spare them from death, and this can be achieved by satisfying God’s wishes. Much in the same way, small children believe their caregivers can protect them from all dangers of life, and a way to obtain this result is to secure their caregivers’ love by satisfying their wishes. In some sense, monotheisms stem from a very early developmental stage in which children have not yet learned or cannot yet really believe that they someday will become like their caregivers.
4. CONCLUSION

In this study, I have endeavored to show that norms are not a unitary phenomenon. They can be traced back to different emotions. Hence, if some behavior was performed out of a normative emotion, it is of paramount importance to investigate which normative emotion specifically caused it.

Among other things, this approach makes it possible to speak, not only of guilt and shame cultures but also of anger, indignation, disgust, and pride cultures or subcultures. The same behavioral pattern may be caused by different superegoic emotions, depending on the culture under investigation.

In table 1, I summarize the ways “Ego’s performing \( \neg \chi \) is incompatible with norm.” or “Ego ought to do X” can be reduced to different normative or superegoic emotions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ego (duty-holder)</th>
<th>Alter (right-holder)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ego’s complementary identification with Alter, should Alter become angry in the event of Ego’s ( \neg \chi )</td>
<td>Alter’s anger in the event of Ego’s ( \neg \chi )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ego’s guilt in the event of Ego’s ( \neg \chi )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ego’s shame in the event of Ego’s ( \neg \chi )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ego’s pride in the event of Ego’s ( \chi )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ego’s performing \( \neg \chi \) is incompatible with norm. Ego ought to do \( \chi \)

Tertius (bystander)

Tertius’s concordant identification with Alter in the event of Ego’s \( \neg \chi \)

Tertius’s indignation in the event of Ego’s \( \neg \chi \)

Tertius’s disgust in the event of Ego’s \( \neg \chi \)

Table 1. Possible reductions and psychological locations of a norm concerning Ego’s action \( \chi \)

I can now turn to the following questions:

Is there anything normative emotions share that allows them to be grouped together as “normative” emotions?

Can non-human animals have normative emotions or at least forerunners of them?

With respect to the first question, it is evident that psychoanalysis provides an answer. Normative, or superegoic emotions are the emotions that emerge or are reshaped by virtue of the child’s early interactions with her “godlike” caregiver.

Ego (duty-holder) Alter (right-holder)

Tertius (bystander)
Tracing normative emotions to child–caregiver interactions makes it possible to identify normative emotions without having recourse to obscure terms such as “ought to” or, tautologically, to a concept of normativity (cf., Section 1, above).

To the child the caregiver is the ultimate authority and model—in Latin norma—, and in adults the idea of normativity, or authoritativeness originates from the way they experienced their caregivers when they were children.

There cannot be normativity without early child–caregiver interactions. At most, there may be proto-normative phenomena such as unsocialized reactive aggression, unsocialized proactive aggression, and pain for having hurt a loved one, which can also be referred to as “proto-anger”, “proto-indignation”, and “proto-guilt”.52

However, these proto-normative phenomena cannot be recognized as such without the notion of an emotion emerging from or being reshaped through a child’s interactions with her “godlike” caregiver.

As for question (2), its answer depends on whether non-human animals experience their caregiver (mostly their mother) as a “godlike” being, and that experience produces the emergence or reshaping of certain emotions.

As noted previously, if this is not the case, then one can speak of proto-normativity but not of full-blown normativity.

However, it may possible to trace parallel but different mechanisms that, for example, are related to domestication. This possibility with respect to guilt was suggested in Section 3. Such phenomena may definitely be referred to as para-normative phenomena. However, to be truly para-normative phenomena, they must at least partly emerge through socialization, not selection.53 According to the conceptualization proposed here, without socialization there can be neither full-blown normative phenomena nor para-normative ones.54

52This approach implies that we can use the term “proto-right” when discussing animal behavior. However, I would not use “right” without, quotes, prefixes, or qualifications as Richard Wrangham does when speaking of “fights over mating rights” (1999: 4). Further, when using terms such as “right” and “proto-right”, one should always specify whether such entities are located within the right- or proto-right-holder, within the jural or proto-jural duty-holder, within third parties, or within two or all of them. Thus, to state that the alpha male has a proto-right to sexual monopoly may mean that he has a disposition to reactively aggress those who violate it, that a violator has a disposition to not reactively counter-aggress an alpha male who should aggress him due to his violation of that monopoly (or that the violator violates it in a circumspect manner, cf. de Waal 1991: 338), or else that other individuals in the group have a disposition to not react against an alpha male who aggresses a violator. If such phenomena are absent, we can speak neither of a jural nor of a proto-jural mating monopoly.

53Here I am focusing on domestication as the result of a form of socialization. I am not denying that domestication may be first and foremost the result of biological selection (see Wrangham 2019).

54I wish to thank Riccardo Mazzola, who read a previous version of this article, and one of the anonymous reviewers for their precious advice. Mistakes are mine only.
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