THE CONCEPT OF PUNISHMENT IN
PLATO’S ESCHATOLOGICAL MYTHS

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ABSTRACT
The paper focuses on Plato’s concept of punishment from the perspective of the eschatological myths in the Gorgias, the Phaedo and the Republic. The fundamental message of all three mythical accounts is found in the attempt to visualize the unseen life of the soul, with special attention to the conditions of its proper activity. The special issue of its rewards and punishments is not restricted to the afterlife experience of the soul but is primarily related to the here-and-now perspective of the incarnated life. Instead of the consequentialist vision of a post mortem destiny punishing past wrongdoing, the proposed interpretation stresses the actual concern with our present situation. Given the intrinsic value of virtue (and the corresponding badness of vice), the platonic images of the afterlife could be read as an intensification of human experience during this life. Closely related topics – the process of judgement and the method and effect of punishment – are outlined in further detail. Here, the paper points out Plato’s transformative approach to the function of punishment. Against the background of the contemporary Athenian legal system, Plato offers a philosophic alternative of cultivating the soul through the power of dialectical examination and Socratic elenchos.

KEYWORDS
Plato, eschatological myths, punishment, judgement, soul.
The introductory note should be devoted to the very presence of the mythical element in Plato’s writing. Using mythical imagery is one of the characteristic strategies of Plato’s literary communication drawing on, and at the same time critically responding to, predominant literary genres of contemporary Greek culture. Plato’s authorial approach typically includes selective use of traditional motifs and their transformation in the new context led by his philosophical insight. Adopting traditional elements permits Plato to convey complex ideas effectively in a very dense and compact form: the names of traditional figures and places that he mentions can resonate in the mind of a listener or a reader and evoke a range of appropriate associations. What Plato does is restructuring these associations and filling them with new meaning that fits with his overall vision.

The transposition of mythical imagery into a philosophical set of ideas is a powerful device to visualize the invisible. As Catherine Collobert puts it: “While reading a Platonic myth we come to grips with a specific issue, experiencing a way of looking at the issue and having a tangible and visible grasp of what is by nature invisible and intangible”. The issue that arises in this way before our eyes in the eschatological myths is primarily the life and dispositions of the soul, as I will try to show.

In the course of the dialogue, a vivid and comprehensible image can serve as a shortcut that complements the laborious process of argumentation. As regards the eschatological myths, I suppose that they are designed to amplify the arguments of the discussion, not to present ideas ungraspable by reason, nor to supplement supposedly deficient arguments with threats of punishments or promises of rewards in the hereafter. This is why my analysis will be based on the assumption that the narrative structure of each myth corresponds to the previous argumentation developed in the course of the dialogue and that its characteristic tone resonates with the overall philosophic concern expressed in the discursive parts of the Platonic text.


2 Cf. R. G. Edmonds III, Whip Scars on the Naked Souls: Myth and Elenchos in Plato’s Gorgias, in: C. Collobert – P. Destrée – F. J. Gonzales (eds.), Plato and Myth, pp. 165-185, p. 183: “The support of the most authoritative voice in the tradition, whose tellings are familiar to nearly all of Plato’s intended audience, shows that Plato’s ideas fit within the framework of Greek culture, making them more acceptable and persuasive to his audience even as he engages in shifting their values and ideals.”

3 C. Collobert, The Platonic Art of Myth-Making: Myth as Informative Phantasma, in: C. Collobert – P. Destrée – F. J. Gonzales (eds.), Plato and Myth, pp. 87-108, p. 102. The same can be stated about Plato’s famous images of the soul in the Phaedrus and in Book IX of the Republic. Characterizing these philosophical images as “informative phantasmata”, Catherine Collobert makes this distinction: “a doxastic phantasma is an image of a sensible object, which is shaped out of a belief about what the object is, that is, an appearance, while an informative phantasma is an image of an intelligible object that is shaped out of knowledge about what the object is, that is, a sketch of the truth” (ibid.).
THE JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE GORGIAS

The correspondence between the argumentative and the figurative part of the dialogue can be first observed in the Gorgias. Here, the topic of punishment is worked out within a fundamental debate on whether it is better to be punished for injustice or to escape punishment, the debate that draws attention to the process of judgement itself and the subsequent effects of the punishment. In the concluding myth Plato develops this topic with reference to the post-mortem destiny and elaborates a vivid scenery of judgement of a person’s whole life, centred around a picture of judicial reform, distinguishing the eras of the mythical reign of Cronus and Zeus. The impulse to the reform lies in recognizing the defects of the former system of judging leading to inadequate distribution of the deceased either to the Isles of the Blessed or to the Tartarus:

“The cases are now indeed judged ill and it is because they who are on trial are tried in their clothing, for they are tried alive. Now many ... who have wicked souls are clad in fair bodies and ancestry and wealth, and at their judgement appear many witnesses to testify that their lives have been just. Now, the judges are confounded not only by their evidence but at the same time by being clothed themselves while they sit in judgement, having their own soul muffled in the veil of eyes and ears and the whole body. Thus all these are a hindrance to them, their own habiliments no less than those of the judged.” (Gorg. 523c-d).

4 The core of the reform depicted in the myth lies in these radical changes made by Zeus:

“We must put a stop to their foreknowledge of their death; for this they at present foreknow ... Next they must be stripped bare of all those things before they are tried; for they must stand their trial dead. Their judge also must be naked, dead, beholding with very soul the very soul of each immediately upon his death, bereft of all his kin and having left behind on earth all that fine array, to the end that the judgement may be just.” (Gorg. 523d-e).

Thus Aeacus, Minos and Rhadamanthus are appointed judges over human deeds, thoroughly examining each and every soul. At first sight, by this narrative the problem of judgement and punishment is transferred to the afterlife. But we shouldn’t miss an important sign of doubling the perspective and drawing a parallel between the afterlife judgement and the contemporary situation of the interlocutors:

“Those who are benefited by the punishment they get from gods and men are they who have committed remediable offences; but still it is through bitter throes of pain

that they receive their benefit both here and in the nether world; for in no other way can there be riddance of iniquity" (Gorg. 525b).  

This dual reference to a this-world perspective and another-world perspective has already been prepared by an earlier quote from Euripides: “Who knows if being alive is really being dead, and being dead being alive?” (492e10–11). These hints imply that the image of the afterlife is not an end in itself but is decisively related to the human situation during this life. From this point of view, the distinction between judging before and after Zeus´ reform corresponds to the distinction between two types of speech practices of contemporary Athens, elaborated earlier in the dialogue: the law-court rhetoric on one side and Socratic dialogical practice on the other side.  

The myth concisely represents the characteristics of both types of speeches: like judging under Cronus, the contemporary law-court rhetoric manifests itself in establishing the most positive outer appearance of the defendant, it relies on witnesses and elaborate speeches, it appeals to the masses, and by creating a good impression it promises to protect the defendant against impeding punishment; on the contrary, Socratic dialogical practice, similar to the face-to-face examination of mythical judges under Zeus, appeals to individuals and calls only the interlocutor himself as a witness. It disregards status, reputation and external appearance and concentrates only on the examination of the soul itself. In such multiplied perspective, the mechanism of judgement emerges both in its defective and in its due form. At the same time the proper effects of punishment begin to take shape. In accordance with the conviction stated firmly by Socrates in the dialogue about beneficial effects of punishment, the positive impact of punishment is stressed both on the argumentative and the figurative level of the dialogue. A close link between these two levels is provided by the medical metaphor of the diagnosis and healing of the soul that underlies both the demonstration of Socrates’ elenctic dialogical practice and the mythical image.

The medical metaphor is applied in Socrates’ debate with Polus on whether it is better to suffer or to commit injustice and whether it is better to be punished for injustice or to escape punishment. The working of the metaphor is underlined by an elaborate analogy between soul and body, namely between the constitutive and restorative arts responsible for a good condition of the soul and the body.

\[\text{εἰςίν δὲ οἱ μὲν ὕφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες ὑπὸ θεὸν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὕτως οἱ ἄν ἱάσματα ἀμαρτήματα ἀμάρτωσιν: ὃς δὲ ὑπὸ ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἢ ὕφελία καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἀθήνας ὑπὸ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄλλως ἰδίας ἀπαλάττεσθαι (Platonis Opera, ed. J. Burnet, Oxford 1903).


\[\text{Gorg. 472e, 473b, 476a, 478c-479d.}
respectively. Thus an analogy is established between legislation and justice on one side and gymnastics and medicine on the other side. Confronting these arts with their defective and pandering counterparts, the analogy is complemented with establishing a similar relationship between sophistry and rhetoric operating on the plane of the soul, and cosmetics and cookery operating on the plane of the body (465c). The analogy between possible conditions of soul and body, together with an internalist conception of injustice, conceived as a bad condition of the soul (477b), is then articulated in the medical metaphor of diagnosing and healing. Like medical treatment positively affects the body, punishment positively affects the corrupted soul. Contrary to the conviction of exponents of clever law-court rhetoric that it is desirable to avoid being punished, it is stressed that punishment is a necessary therapeutic agent. It would be foolish to try to escape punishment like a child who avoids the doctor for fear of painful treatment. Pain is an unpleasant feature of medical treatment which nevertheless unavoidably accompanies the curing process.

This is the moment for further consideration of the function of punishment and the role of pain in it. From the perspective of the judicial reform depicted in the concluding myth, the proper counterpart of just examination of the souls deprived of all fine array in the afterlife judgement is Socratic examination taking place face to face between two individuals: the examiner and the examined. Such examination combines the element of diagnosis with the element of healing. The effect of Socratic elenchus is precisely that of determining crooked opinions leading to errors in one’s life and confronting the examined person with the contradictions into which he falls. At the same time, the exposure to the contradictions brings with it an unpleasant shaming effect. The painful experience of shame that the interlocutor feels as he loses the argument and his way of life is discredited corresponds to the punishment of the judged soul in the afterlife.

Transposed to the perspective of this life, the painful experience of elenchus may serve as a kind of “bitter medicine” given to those whose soul is in an inappropriate state. It is from this point of view that Christopher Rowe speaks about a redefinition of the concept of punishment detectable in the Gorgias. Instead of the conventional concept of punishment including imprisonment, fine, exile or execution there is the Socratic version of it: from the perspective of Socratic dialogical strategies, the process of punishment coincides with the laborious process of examination and instruction through speech.  

8 Cf. Gorg. 479b-c.
10 A similar assumption of coincidence between punishment and instruction through speech may be observed in the Euthyphro. Here, Socrates claims that if he gains knowledge of piety, he should be able to secure his acquittal on charges of impiety. How is it meant? G. F. Edwards proposes a reading according to which Socrates believes that this knowledge will make him pious henceforth and
The method of Socratic elenchus has the same double effect as the penalties imposed on the wrongdoers according to the reformed judgement in the myth:

“And it is fitting that every one under punishment rightly inflicted on him by another should either be made better and profit thereby, or serve as an example to the rest, that others seeing the sufferings he endures may in fear amend themselves. Those who are benefited by the punishment they get from gods and men are they who have committed remediable offences; but still it is through bitter throes of pain that they receive their benefit both here and in the nether world; for in no other way can there be riddance of iniquity. But of those who have done extreme wrong and, as a result of such crimes, have become incurable, of those are the examples made; no longer are they profited at all themselves, since they are incurable, but others are profited who behold them undergoing for their transgressions the greatest, sharpest, and most fearful sufferings evermore, actually hung up as examples there in the infernal dungeon, a spectacle and a lesson to such of the wrongdoers as arrive from time to time.” (Gorg. 525b-d).

The double effect of punishment, which means either benefiting by becoming better or becoming an example to others, is consistent with the medical metaphor distinguishing the curable and incurable ones. This applies both to the level of this world and the other world: like the destiny of the curable ones illustrates how one can profit in the here-and-now perspective from philosophic examination, the fate of the incurable ones demonstrates the un-philosophic way of life of those who in a Calliclean manner avoid any kind of outside restraint. As Radcliffe Edmonds puts it: “Their inconsistent and irrational lifestyle actually inflicts continuous suffering upon them, and their souls are so deformed from the way they have lived that they can only continue, in the afterlife, the kind of life they lived when alive.”

Only then does Socrates´ remark that sounds so provocative to Callicles become intelligible:

“And so again conversely, supposing it is our duty to injure somebody... we must make every exertion of act and word to prevent him from being punished or coming to trial, or if he does, we must contrive that our enemy shall escape and not be punished ... or if he has committed crimes that deserve death, that he shall not die; if that his instruction in piety is itself a suitable punishment for any past impiety. In such an innovative sense, the process of reforming a wrongdoer through successful teaching – in the form of a philosophical dialogue - constitutes punishment. G. F. Edwards, How to Escape Indictment for Impiety: Teaching as Punishment in the Euthyphro, in: Journal of the History of Philosophy 54, 1, 2016, pp. 1-19.

11 Cf. Prot. 324a-b, 325a; Leg. 854d-855a.


13 This is a hypothetical suggestion that complements previous appeal for avoiding injustice and accusing oneself and anyone of one’s friends who may be guilty of committing injustice. (Gorg. 480c-d).
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possible, never die, but be deathless in his villainy, or failing that, live as long a time as may be in that condition.” (Gorg. 480e-481a).

The image of the deathless wrongdoer strengthens the conviction that the worst evil is to remain in a permanent state of inner psychic disorder and be deprived of any kind of remedy.

TOPOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SOULS IN THE PHAEDO

A similar tone can be recognized in the myth in the Phaedo. Here, Plato does not elaborate on the process of judgement itself, but focuses instead on detailed description of various places assigned to the souls as a result of their judgement and creates a complex geography providing an impressive scene corresponding to a variety of conditions of the soul. Considering the mythical setting, Kenneth Dorter suggests that the myth presents an image of our embodied existence, thereby presenting “the timeless in temporal form, or the implicit present in an explicit future”.

On this point I rather agree with Sara Brill’s refinement that the myth’s presentation occurs “not primarily through discussion of time but through an account of place”. In this sense the myth offers a kind of taxonomy of souls manifested in their topographic distribution.

The account opens up to reveal a complex geography of the earth and its differentiated regions. This comprehensive account strongly relies on familiar features of traditional afterlife myths as well as certain features of traditional mythical topography transmitted in the epic, but at the same time it transforms the inherited motives and rebuilds them into a new shape of a unique whole. The structure of the universe comprises six zones ranging from the most impure at its innermost core to the purest located beyond the outermost limits of the surface of the true earth. Seen from the perspective of our present position, above the region of misty hollows providing living place for incarnated souls, i.e. ourselves as human beings, there is a bright-coloured earth with pure aetheric climate, and beyond this earth lies the uttermost place of ineffable beauty. And conversely, continuing inwards from our living place, there are vast underground regions interconnected by a rich watercourse system.

14 The act of judgement is only mentioned in Phd. 107d and 113d3, and its results are revealed in Phd. 113d-114c.
17 Another kind of such a taxonomy could be found in the frequent images of transmigration of souls within different kinds of human and animal lives.
18 It should be noted that the description given in the myth does not adopt this human perspective but offers an external supra-human view of the earth from above.
including mythical rivers and lakes. Finally, the innermost core of this physical structure is dominated by the most turbulent environment of the permanent up-and-down flux of the Tartarus.

This is the physical scheme into which the destinies of souls are inscribed. The whole universe is ensouled, because its various regions provide dwelling places for different souls according to their various dispositions. Opening the perspective of the afterlife, the myth depicts possible relocations of souls, now occupying one of the earth’s hollows, and their possible move upwards or downwards. The language of the myth speaks again about an assessment of the inner disposition of the soul, which is decisive for its further lot:

“For the soul takes with it to the other world nothing but its education and nurture, and these are said to benefit or injure the departed greatly from the very beginning of his journey thither.” (Phd. 107d)

The soul’s judgement, concerning its virtue and vice, results in an appropriate distribution of the souls to corresponding places within the hierarchy of the world structure, presented in the mythical articulation as places of punishments and rewards. The myth contrasts the destinies of the good and the wicked and offers rich taxonomy of possible conditions of souls ranging from the best condition of the purest philosophic souls to the worst condition of incurably unjust souls. Between these extreme poles there are other subtly differentiated classes of souls including pious and truly virtuous souls, a wide category of souls of “middle” moral qualities, and finally wicked, but curable souls. The illustrative overview of the adequate location of each soul within the world system, where the pure and impure environments match the moral condition of the souls living within them, at the same time reveals that the overall arrangement of the universe manifests a principle of order and justice, assigning each thing its appropriate place. Here, a strong connection appears with the search for a cause in the sense of “the power which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed” (Phd. 99c) – a search undertaken in the argumentative part of the dialogue.

Turning to the concept of punishment itself, we may focus on specific description of the fates connected with the restless environment of the underground regions. Three categories of souls are allocated there: the “middling” souls occupy the area of Acherusian Lake, the souls of curable offenders undergo temporary punishment in Tartarus followed by a cruise in the streams of the rivers Kokytos or Pyriflegthon, with the risk of repeated circulation between the area of Tartarus and these mythical rivers, unless they beg their victims successfully and are allowed to relocate to the Acherusian Lake. Most impressive is the penalty imposed on those who have

\^ Cf. the striking resemblance of “marine” imagery adopted in the description of the life of the embodied soul in Resp. 611c-e.
committed the worst crimes against humans and gods and are considered incurable. They are cast in the lowest pits of Tartarus with no return.

Now the physical conditions of Tartarus are significant. With clear Hesiodic reminiscence,²⁰ they are described as follows:

“... this liquid matter has no bottom or foundation. So it oscillates and waves up and down, and the air and wind about it do the same; for they follow the liquid both when it moves toward the other side of the earth and when it moves toward this side, and just as the breath of those who breathe blows in and out, so the wind there oscillates with the liquid and causes terrible and irresistible blasts as it rushes in and out.” (Phd. 112b)

The image of a wrongdoer caught in such an extremely turbulent environment without any fixed point, thrown permanently back and forth, brings to mind the above-mentioned idea sketched in the Gorgias about the continuous experiencing of one’s own wickedness. Playing with the perspective of life and death, the image of a deathless wrongdoer translates itself into the image of a soul permanently experiencing the fierce pulsation of Tartarus, corresponding to the disturbed and corrupted nature of the soul itself.

The whole imagery of the underground water system in the Phaedo can also remind us of a similar message conveyed by the myth of the water-carriers in the Gorgias (493a-c). In both contexts the double image of permanent flow turns out to be a manifestation of a certain lifestyle. Be it a never ending flow of insatiable hedonic pleasures, be it ever changing moods of the crowd that a gratifying orator tries to meet, these fluid powers disrupt the lives of those who distrust rational argumentation and are not guided by philosophical insight. The contrast between philosophic and un-philosophic life is intensified by the image of the incurably unjust, who has no choice but to stay in his miserable condition. For him there is no remedy in the form of examination through speech, because he is totally deprived of any guidance and help (Phd. 108b), as well as any communication, unlike the other souls enjoying mutual contact with each other and some of them even with the gods themselves (Phd. 111c1-2). The incurable stays not only forever in his miserable condition, but he stays in it alone.

So, the torments presented in the myth resemble the punishments of the un-philosophic and correspond to the experience of the un-philosophic during their incarnate existence, unguided by rational argumentation and tormented by their desires and appetites. The message of these powerful images turns out to be protreptical, encouraging a differently oriented lifestyle.

²⁰ Cf. Hesiod, Theog. 736-743.
THE REPUBLIC

Some of the foregoing motives also reappear in the Republic. The topic of Hades and the afterlife punishments and rewards is foreshadowed from the very beginning, both in the introductory talk with Cephalus (Resp. 330d-331a) and in Adeimantus’ critical response to the poetic rendering of the afterlife with its colourful portrayal of rewards for the good and just and punishments for the wicked and unjust (Resp. 362e-363e). Instead of such a consequentialist conception of justice, viewed in the light of its further benefits and compensations, the interlocutors demand an assessment of the intrinsic value of justice and an adequate praise of its internal impact.

What is then the place of the concluding myth within the overall structure of the Republic, if its purpose is not simply to offer comforting reassurance that justice pays in the end and that past wrongdoings will finally be punished? It is exactly the response to the introductory demand to praise justice in order to motivate the listener to act virtuously. In this way, the myth complements previous intellectual argumentation: the preceding discussion was designed to stress an internal foundation of justice and build a rational understanding of its value; now the myth prepares the ground for its emotional acceptance. Here, the myth touches on an important issue of human motivation, and it could be read as emotionally loaded communication carrying a protreptic message designed to motivate the audience to pursue justice and adopt a philosophical way of life.²¹

Let’s have a closer look at the treatment of punishment in this context. Plato employs an image of upward and downward paths of the souls enjoying rewards and suffering punishments according to their deeds, and again he pays special attention to the figure of the incurably wicked, destined to permanent suffering in Tartarus ( Resp. 615c-616a). Besides this impressive visual accent on the wretchedness of the life of a tyrant, concentrating in itself the characteristics of an unjust and disordered lifestyle, the myth newly draws attention to more delicate risks. The last section of the myth offers an interesting shift of emphasis and, among other things, focuses on a category of souls which have gone unnoticed so far. The myth culminates with a scene of souls choosing their new lives. These choices are made with very diverse results. The exemplary case is the first choice blindly preferring the life of a tyrant full of terrible deeds. Paradoxically, this foolish choice is made by a soul returning from a heavenly sojourn, a soul supposedly good.²² Two reasons are given


²² The question may be raised whether such a disastrous choice does not mean a failure of the apparatus of cosmic justice. An elaborate analysis of the extent of human responsibility, with special attention to the element of irreducible uncertainty and opaqueness of the human condition, offers S.
for such an alarming outcome: a lack of suffering – which suggests positive evaluation of the experience of pain and suffering$^{23}$ – and a lack of deeper understanding:

"He was one of those who had come down from heaven, a man who had lived in a well-ordered polity in his former existence, participating in virtue by habit and not by philosophy." (Resp. 619c-d)

The emphasis on the habitual basis of the virtue of this apparently decent fellow, stressing at the same time the insufficiency and inability to foresee possible consequences in ethically complicated situations, warns us of the risks endangering every soul, no less the souls of the majority of average people who conform to established habits and lead – at least at first glance – a decent and orderly life. Highlighting the extremely problematic and dangerous potential of their implicit ethical weakness, the appeal to seek philosophical understanding becomes highly urgent.

The whole arrangement of the narrative indicates again that the distinction between a this-life and an afterlife perspective is somewhat blurred. The notion of disembodied souls is constantly mixed not only with the very physical language describing their experiences in Hades$^{24}$ but also with the language implying their personal continuity through this life and the afterlife. The souls in the narrative keep a quasi-personal identity based on memory and personal history,$^{25}$ and it seems that these personal factors influence their choices most.

Now it is significant that in his comment Socrates translates the gravity of the life choice in Hades into an imperative directed at “each of us”:

“And there, dear Glaucon, it appears, is the supreme hazard for a man. And this is the chief reason why it should be our main concern that each of us, neglecting all other studies, should seek after and study this thing—if in any way he may be able to learn of and discover the man who will give him the ability and the knowledge to


$^{23}$ This point is generalized: “one may perhaps say that a majority of those who were thus caught were of the company that had come from heaven, inasmuch as they were unexercised in suffering” (Resp. 619d).

$^{24}$ The souls bear the signs of their judgement “in front” (prosthen) or “behind” (opisthen), talk to each other, feast, rejoice and cry, are beaten, bound on hands and feet and dragged through thorns (Resp. 614c-615c).

distinguish the life that is good from that which is bad, and always and everywhere to choose the best that the conditions allow...” (Resp. 618b-c)

This appeal is repeated at the end of the dialogue, where the mythical story is related to the interlocutors themselves as something that can provide guidance for their own lives. The emphasis clearly shifts to the here-and-now perspective and accentuates the utmost gravity of the burden lying on human life. The most important decisions moulding human life to a certain shape are made at present, and they should be guided by a fundamental understanding of good and bad. Let’s notice that the figure of a teacher, probably a discussion partner, who is mentioned here, again evokes the above-mentioned idea that this understanding can be achieved through mutual contact and interpersonal communication. This, however, is the task of our present existence.

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According to this quick overview it seems that Plato’s philosophical re-composition of the afterlife topic never loses sight of our present situation and reflects a serious interest in the problem of ethical improvement. The treatment of punishment corresponds to this context. Plato flexibly manipulates shared patterns of the afterlife journey and reshapes them to bear a new message. Playing with the imagery of post mortem punishments and rewards, he offers a transformed concept of inner examination undertaken in a philosophical debate.

**“And so, Glauccon, the tale was saved, as the saying is, and was not lost. And it will save us if we believe it...” (Resp. 621b-c).**

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