NOT EYE TO EYE: A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES

BART SCHULTZ
University of Chicago
rschultz@uchicago.edu

ABSTRACT
A brief critical reflection on the reception of my books The Happiness Philosophers: The Lives and Works of the Great Utilitarians (Princeton, 2017) and Henry Sidgwick, Eye of the Universe (Cambridge, 2004). The clarifications and rejoinders offered are, I believe, important for understanding how these works reflect both a sympathetic, complex reconstruction of the classical utilitarian legacy and an approach to the history of philosophy prioritizing diversity and inclusion.

KEYWORDS

On the whole, the reception of my various published works on Henry Sidgwick, the Victorian era utilitarian philosopher, has been a most fortunate and pleasant one, and I am proud to have played a role in the continuing resurgence of Sidgwick’s philosophical reputation. When I published the edited collection Essays on Henry Sidgwick (Cambridge, 1992), I worried that Sidgwick’s cognitivist intuitionist metaethics and hedonistic value theory were beyond salvaging, given the profound influence of Rawlsian and neo-Rawlsian approaches. And yet it is on precisely these counts that Sidgwick’s position has re-emerged with renewed force, in such brilliant works as Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer’s The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics (Oxford, 2014), Roger Crisp’s The Cosmos of Duty: Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics (2015), and of course, Derek Parfit’s magnificent
three volume *On What Matters* (Oxford, 2011-17). Somehow, it is very gratifying to have had my earlier lapses in critical judgment corrected by friends and fellow travellers – and by myself – rather than by hostile criticism from the outside.

And this pattern largely continues to hold in the case of my most recent book, *The Happiness Philosophers: The Lives and Works of the Great Utilitarians* (Princeton, 2017). The most hostile review, that by Helen Andrews in *The Hedgehog Review* (“Shiny Happy People,” Fall 2017), disarmingly allows that “the English utilitarians were more modern in their opinions than any group of reformers from the Diggers to the SDS. Let other Victorians plead for leniency on grounds of being ‘men of their times.’ The utilitarians took a twenty-first century line on nearly every issue from divorce to gay rights to secularism. If compliance with modern sensitivities on race and gender determined reputations, the utilitarians would be the most popular philosophical school in the Anglo-American tradition.” (p. 145). For Andrews, the classical utilitarians are so “unloved today” because “they were—in manners, in conduct, in personality—repulsive individuals.” (p. 146). What follows is a rant by, appropriately enough, the “Robert Novak Journalism Fellow” directed (or misdirected) mainly at Godwin that largely recycles the standard right-wing umbrage that Godwin has always provoked, from the Tories of his day to the writers for the *National Review* in our own. It is nice to see that a kind word on his behalf can still provoke such indignation, and one can only say that if the classical utilitarians, with their progressive views on race and gender, represent what Andrews counts as “repulsive people,” then clearly the world would be a much better place if we had many more repulsive people like them. Unlike our current political leaders, who have made true repulsiveness a way of life, they could never be singled out by the “#Me Too” movement.

Andrews bases her case on the presupposition that the utilitarians are in bad repute today because familiarity with their personal lives has bred repulsion. This is a manifestly false claim, not least because there has been scarcely any popular interest in the biographies of most of the great classical utilitarians, with the possible exception of Mill. The public at large, even the larger academic public, would have considerable difficulty even recognizing the names of Sidgwick and Godwin, much less saying anything of substance about either their lives or their philosophies. However, it is worth clarifying a related point about *The Happiness Philosophers* that seems to have caused some confusion even with more philosophically-minded reviewers. Thus, David Phillips, in his review of the book
in the Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Sept. 12, 2017, see http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-happiness-philosophers-the-lives-and-works-of-the-great-utilitarians/), worries about just how far the book would go in allowing the lives of the great utilitarians to trump the arguments expressed in their works. After quoting my line on how the book reflects “the belief that one needs the works and the lives, the words and the deeds, in order fully to harvest the contributions of the great philosophers,” he asks: “Are we, for instance, supposed to decide whether Moore or Ross is right about consequentialism by biographical evaluation, or by examining their political attitudes?” But then, after invoking Ray Monk on how “the question arises whether he or she [some great writer being made the subject of biographical study] can possibly be understood without some attempt to master their work. I think the answer to this is, in general, 'no','” Phillips allows that if “this is the ambition, Schultz's book succeeds admirably; the reader comes away with an enriched appreciation of Godwin, Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick as human beings, and of them and their philosophical projects as parts of 18th and 19th century history.”

The latter ambition, but not the former, did figure in my approach in The Happiness Philosophers, but in the main, the aim was rather simpler, despite my admiration for the destructive force of Nietzsche's account of Kant's psychology. This aim was nicely captured in a comment on the Phillips review by James Crimmins: “A quirky review. Don't think Schultz meant his attention to the biographies of utilitarians to be a substitute for philosophical interpretation based on textual analysis. Rather the biographical perspective helps us to appreciate their ideas in a more complete sense” (personal communication). The very line quoted by Phillips indicates that we need both the works and the lives if we are to fully harvest the contributions of the great philosophers, and I do not believe that I ever indicated that the lives should somehow serve as a substitute for close study of the works, rather than helping us amplify and better understand the works, sometimes in crucial respects, and as a corrective to historically naïve readings of the texts. One can, for example, learn quite a bit about Moore’s way of doing philosophy by considering his Cambridge context, the Bloomsbury group, etc. And after all, consideration of the lives is but part of the consideration of the social context that any appropriately reflexive critical theoretical project should encourage, or any narrative historicist approach, which, as Kevin Birmingham neatly put it, rather than “embedding stories in an argument ... embeds arguments in a story” (see https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Great-Shame-of-Our/239148?cid=cp171).
It is worth dwelling on this point, since Phillips does at the end of his review lapse back into claiming that “I don't think that Schultz succeeds in showing that intellectual biographies of philosophers are a substitute for philosophical argument.” Much of his concern is captured in the following passages:

There is also a noteworthy line of thought, present in the earlier book too, which Schultz deploys in connection with the interpretation of the dualism of practical reason. Very roughly, some interpreters have taken at face value most of Sidgwick's words in the places where he explicitly discusses the dualism, and regarded the dualism as a contradiction. Others have for various reasons argued that Sidgwick does think (or ought to have thought) something rather different: that the dualism does not properly involve a contradiction but instead contrasting but compatible agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons. Schultz argues, in effect, in favor of the idea that the dualism has to turn out to be a contradiction, because the dualism is really the expression in Sidgwick's philosophical work of a more general 19th century cosmic pessimism brought on by the loss of religious faith. This might be a point at which biographical work could play a distinctive philosophical role, even if Schultz's grander ambitions for philosophical biography are misconceived. On the whole, though, I am still inclined to the view that the interpretation of Sidgwick's philosophical texts is a matter primarily of the ideas and arguments in those texts and the quality of those arguments, rather than of independent biographical data.

To assess the overall philosophical caliber of Schultz's book, it matters what comparison class one has in mind. One kind of comparison class would include another recent work that puts Sidgwick in a larger historical context: Thomas Hurka's *British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing*. I think philosophers will learn more about the merits of Sidgwick's case for utilitarianism, and of the case for utilitarianism more generally, from Hurka's book than they will from Schultz's. Hurka's book has a more narrowly philosophical focus; it helpfully treats Sidgwick together with other philosophers who, though they basically shared his metaethical views, were *not* utilitarians; and it draws on Hurka's own major contributions to ethical theory. If Hurka's book is in the comparison class, Schultz's treatment of the philosophical issues comes off second best. On the other hand, if the comparison class includes only histories or intellectual biographies or intellectual biographies of philosophers, Schultz's book rates very high. He pretty much always manages to convey a clear sense both of the larger issues and the key details. Most of those who care about these issues will of course find that they disagree with him at various points, but they won't think that's because he lacks a proper sense of the contours of the debates.

Now, I should confess that, at one level, this is an optimal arrangement, since I would rather be in the company of Ray Monk than of Thomas Hurka, and Hurka would no doubt prefer it that way as well. This is not to deny that Hurka’s work is
very important and captures a big alternative historical narrative that takes Sidgwick to be a stone on the path of progress leading to Ross and various other twentieth-century figures. Not all of Sidgwick’s admirers follow Hurka in this, but there is a very real divide here between those who are more receptive to Russian pluralist intuitionism and those who are more critical of it. On this, I am more in the company of de Lazari-Radek and Singer, which is also very good company.

But more to the point, my interpretation of Sidgwick on the dualism of practical reason is derived from Sidgwick’s own words, but words from his letters and memoirs (and other publications) in which he candidly talks about the real worries behind the arguments floated in the Methods. It is inaccurate to say that I argue “in effect, in favor of the idea that the dualism has to turn out to be a contradiction, because the dualism is really the expression in Sidgwick’s philosophical work of a more general 19th century cosmic pessimism brought on by the loss of religious faith.” Sidgwick himself puts it that way, repeatedly, in his more candid writings reflective of his living worldview. The idea that he would somehow be placated by recasting (or reconstructing) the conflict in terms of agent neutral versus agent relative reasons, while leaving any actual ethical decision making some amorphous balancing act, scarcely seems plausible in light of such statements as the following, reproduced in Henry Sidgwick, A Memoir:

Some fifteen years ago, when I was writing my book on Ethics, I was inclined to hold with Kant that we must postulate the continued existence of the soul, in order to effect that harmony of Duty with Happiness which seemed to me indispensable to rational moral life. At any rate I thought I might provisionally postulate it, while setting out on the serious search for empirical evidence. If I decide that this search is a failure, shall I finally and decisively make this postulate? Can I consistently with my whole view of truth and the method of its attainment? And if I answer “no” to each of these questions, have I any ethical system at all? (Sidgwick and Sidgwick, 1906, pp. 466–7).

On this point, Tim Mullan, in an excellent review in the Journal of the History of Philosophy, gets it right: “Schultz ranges much more widely, outlining Sidgwick’s contributions to the Cambridge school of economics, his commitment (in collaboration with his wife Eleanor) to higher education for women, and especially his lifelong interest in psychic phenomena—which Schultz persuasively links to Sidgwick’s urgent search for a single rational method of ethics. ‘This was no mere fetishizing of determinateness in ethics. It was a concern about just how...
tragic the Cosmos might really be” (Journal of the History of Philosophy, 56:1 [January 2018], p. 180). This point also marks a relevant reply to some of the critical reviews of Henry Sidgwick, Eye of the Universe, such as T. H. Irwin’s “A ‘Fundamental Misunderstanding’?” (Utilitas, 19:1 [2007], pp. 78-90).

Perhaps part of the value of examining both lives, as reflected in letters, diaries, and other sources, as well as the more famous published works, is that one can use the authors own words to suggest why he or she might not be so happily interpreted—or rather, reconstructed—to fit various recent analytical contrivances. And one should not mistake the latter gambit with the truly “philosophical,” a narrow mindset that would exclude Socrates, Plato, Montaigne, Nietzsche, Simone de Beauvoir, and so many others from the philosophical canon. It was after all Plato’s Socrates who said: “If I don’t reveal my views in a formal account, I do so by my conduct. Don’t you think that actions are more reliable evidence than words?” (HP, p. 5). But in the case at issue, it is not simply actions against words, but actions and candid words against admittedly guarded published words. The venerable debates about the shifting, fluid boundaries of text and context, historical contextualization versus reconstruction, etc. could be brought in here, but suffice to say that it is very strange to think that one can better understand a canonical text by considering the often obscure historical texts that the author had in mind, but not when those texts happen to be the author’s own.

This is of course not to say that authorial intention should somehow (impossibly) be absolutely controlling of the interpretation or reception of an author’s works. It would be more accurate to say that a narrow textualist fixation on particular canonical works can arbitrarily silence the author’s voice and context in various ways, censoring other relevant texts and sources. To fail to acknowledge the limits and arbitrariness of one’s chosen texts, in the manner of Phillips, seems more like desperate avoidance than a considered approach to interpretation—an avoidance that appears all too suspect when it concerns matters of race and gender.

Indeed, I think that this type of corrective function shows its worth in many instances, but Phillips would seem to disagree. Another area that I make much of has to do with colonialism, imperialism, and racism. Phillips claims:

The problem with the utilitarians to which he devotes much more attention than standard philosophical treatments is their attitudes to colonialism (on which Bentham does strikingly well, Mill much less so, Sidgwick perhaps in the middle). But if the problem is supposed to be that J.S. Mill, as a matter of biographical fact, was insufficiently critical of imperialism and colonialism, it is surely all too easy to
argue that this is not a problem with utilitarianism but with Mill himself. Utilitarianism as a first principle can only be applied if it is supplemented with empirical facts. Get those wrong and you will get the wrong results, but that’s no problem for the theory.

It is not, as history has demonstrated, “all too easy” to extricate utilitarianism from its more unfortunate historical applications, in part because so much mainstream academic philosophy has for so long been so concerned to whitewash these aspects of the philosophical past. I find it alarming that so many academic philosophers—Phillips is far from alone in this—take such a blandly optimistic view of the subject, and contribute to the problem by simply downplaying the importance of the historical lessons that we need to learn about just how the utilitarian principle (and other ethical theories) can go wrong in its applications. Indeed, “principles” only live in their applications—think of the crucial historical correctives to naïve understandings of the high-sounding phrases of the American Declaration of Independence—and it is telling that there could be such compromised progress over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nor should we exclude the twenty-first century. As I put it in a blog post to the American Philosophical Association, the problematic narrowness of academic philosophy:

is not merely a matter of a general wariness in academic philosophy when it comes to experiential and service learning opportunities, though as a discipline philosophy is remarkably behind the times on those issues and of course on matters of diversity and inclusion. It is rather the remarkable inertia and narrowness of the ways in which the canonical history of philosophy is constructed and taught. That is, while it is obviously vitally important to develop more diverse and inclusive curricula, bringing in neglected philosophers and philosophical traditions, it is just as important to develop widely accepted pedagogical practices for confronting and addressing the racism and sexism of such canonical figures as Aristotle, Locke, Kant, Rousseau, Hume, Schopenhauer, and so many others. Although academic philosophers may at some level recognize the importance of the readings of the tradition advanced by, say, the contributors to Julie K. Ward and Tommy L. Lott’s Philosophers on Race, actually calling serious attention to, rather than gracefully dodging, the problems of racism and sexism when teaching the history of philosophy remains, for many, a very great challenge. Suave evasion, with a perfunctory gesture to “the times,” and an easy obsession with de-contextualized “arguments” can serve to mask issues of vital importance, and in effect teach students to “not see” the more problematic sides of the great philosophers, the forms of exclusion they practiced, and the realities of the excluded. Indeed, teach students not to look for them ... in philosophy, one need only consider John Rawls’s
published and influential (even legendary) lectures on the history of moral philosophy and political philosophy to see the paradigm in action—hundreds and hundreds of pages of often acute historical philosophical reconstruction, but with questions of racism and sexism almost entirely erased. How disturbing that odd incidental personal facts about the philosophers might be introduced in a conventional, preliminary way, but not these more troubling facts, even though they are surely more important than, say, Kant's compulsive daily routines and are often indicative of deep philosophical issues (such as the real meaning of Kant’s cosmopolitan history). (see https://blog.apaonline.org/2016/09/29/on-not-seeing-in-philosophy/)

Such censure and frustration were sparked in part by my own experiences (of over thirty years) teaching philosophy. What Phillips suggests, very cavalierly, is “no problem for the theory” is in fact a very big problem for academic philosophy both past and present; he seems to take a sanguine “not my department” view (after defining his department in the narrowest of terms) when it comes the serious problems of racism and sexism. But philosophy, like the society it reflects, will have trouble changing for the better when such an attitude blinds its representatives. And what exactly is to be gained, one wonders, by taking a purist stance on the meaning of philosophy that seems like a recipe for historical ignorance or worse? The attitude Phillips expresses seems like a throwback to that crude positivism, of the 1940s and 50s, which distinguished itself by the near total absence of any critical historical consciousness.

There are various other points in Phillips's review that call for comment. He holds that Mill was right to dismiss Bentham as a philosopher: “for all that Schultz says here, the charge that Bentham was no philosopher sticks. Or, more charitably and in a more modern idiom, Bentham emerges as the first great utilitarian applied ethicist, particularly noteworthy for his strikingly advanced views on colonialism and sexual morality, but not much cop [sic] at ethical theory or metaethics.” But he makes no mention of my mention of Russell and Quine, both of whom held Bentham in high esteem as a philosopher for his work on paraphrase and the philosophy of language generally. I thought it obvious that if such figures could welcome Bentham into the fold, his philosophical credentials should be taken seriously even by those with narrower analytical notions of philosophy.

Phillips also claims that:

one might ask why Schultz picks just the four thinkers he does. If his subjects were only Bentham, J.S. Mill, and Sิดgwick, the question might not really arise: at this
point, that’s the standard short list of classical utilitarians. But if you are expanding the list, there are lots of ways to go. Edward Albee’s *History of English Utilitarianism* published in 1902 has chapters, *inter alia*, on Cumberland, Hume, Hartley, Abraham Tucker, Paley, and Herbert Spencer (as well as multiple chapters on both J.S. Mill and Sidgwick). It has no chapter on Godwin. Adding just Godwin to the standard list, as Schultz does, might invite the suspicion that he is biasing the case against the Dickensian caricature by selectively focusing on politically progressive and personally fascinating utilitarians.

The point was not simply to expand the list in general, though I did make mention of Cumberland, Hume, Paley et al at various points. The aim, which should have been fairly obvious, was to take the overwhelmingly dominant (and non-theological) figures of the classical period as the main focus, and Godwin was included precisely because he was so important in that context and period. The only name Phillips mentions that could on that basis be added would be Spencer, whose views are noted at various junctures. He was excluded primarily because his version of utilitarianism seems more compromised and ambiguous than the views of the others, but including him would not have changed the overall message of the book, at least insofar as the utilitarian interpretation of him could be defended (on this see the important work of David Weinstein, “Spencer, Herbert,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spencer/).


But the authors also warn that “this book is to be read with caution and a couple of reservations.” As they acknowledge, the book is not meant as an exhaustive biographical treatment of the figures covered, and I gladly admit that there is much work yet to be done, for example by way of spelling out the interweavings of utilitarianism and the Romantic Movement, etc. I hope my book will provoke more such research. But on some of the particular criticisms that they float, I cannot agree.
Thus, they argue that “Schultz assumes that Bentham was a great advocate of animal welfare, but Bentham’s assessment of the moral standing of non-human animals is not entirely clear from the episodes Schultz cites from Memoirs … Contrary to our expectation that Bentham must have been an animal welfarist who opposed meat consumption, a close reading of Memoirs will show that Bentham actually ate meat, and especially liked beef.” But of course, Bentham’s own words on the subject non-human animals are some of the most frequently quoted ones: "The question is not can they reason? Nor, can they talk? But can they suffer?" (Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Chapter xvii.). Moreover, to count animal suffering in the utilitarian calculus does not automatically lead to vegetarianism (though in the world today, it should do, given the contributions of a meat-based diet to climate change). The question is when the suffering of the non-human animals should outweigh the suffering caused by vegetarianism. That the greater happiness could be served, so to speak, by various non-vegetarian diets was not something the great utilitarians denied, though I concede that they probably did too often underestimate the importance of non-human animal suffering. But for a helpful up-to-date account, one that addresses some criticisms from Nakano-Okuno, see de Lazari-Radek and Singer, “Doing Our Best for Hedonistic Utilitarianism,” Etica & Politica, http://www2.units.it/etica/2016_1/SINGER-DE%20LAZARI%20RADEK.pdf.

Furthermore, the authors wonder “why this book contains few criticisms of Sidgwick’s intuitional cognitivism.” I do discuss various criticisms, such as Hurka’s (see p. 390, n. 120), though it is fair to say that I also try to give the defenses against them. But I try to do that with the metaethical positions of all the figures featured in the book. The authors also claim that I misinterpret Sidgwick’s axiom of benevolence by equating it with utilitarianism. But in fact, on the very pages the reviewers cite, I state that “utilitarianism is derived from two more fundamental principles: ‘the self-evident principle that the good of any one individual is of not more importance, from the point of view … of the Universe, then the good of any other; unless, that is, there are special grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realized in the one case than in the other. And it is evident to me that as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally,—so far as it is attainable by my efforts,—not at a particular part of it.” (HP, p. 251). Since that explication comes right before my summary reference to “the utilitarians principle(s) of rational benevolence,” there is little cause for worry that I made Sidgwick sound as though he lapsed into tautology, viewing “the
rational basis of utilitarianism as a utilitarian principle,” as the reviewers suggest, the more so since I devote a deal of space to spelling out how Sidgwick had to add the value theory of hedonism in order to get to full-fledged utilitarianism (pp. 258-63).

Finally, as for the complaint that “if Schultz wanted to expel the caricature of utilitarianism, he should have been aware that it could be misleading to explain, at the outset of the book, that the central claim of utilitarianism was ‘the greatest happiness, or pleasure, of the greatest number’.” But I do not present that wording in such a way—only in passing by way to connecting to the popular slogan that, as I show in the book, was not the favored wording. When I present at the outset the central claim of utilitarianism it is on p. 2, and in this form: “that the supreme ethical and political principle, the normative bottom line so to speak, demands maximizing total happiness for all sentient creatures living and yet to be.” And I discuss Bentham’s own account of how the better-known slogan entered the picture on pp. 66-67.

Lastly, the review suggests that “The Happiness Philosophers should be read as an attempt to explicate how the core doctrine of classical utilitarianism was articulated differently by four different personalities from the end of the eighteenth century through the nineteenth century.” With that I can very happily agree. There is such a thing as classical utilitarianism, though it is a complex, historically shifting cluster of arguments and activisms. But gaining a better critical understanding of just how and why it has been differently articulated by its various champions can help us both in renewing its appeal and in reforming an academic discipline that badly needs reform.

However, I would like to close this piece by striking another chord. 2018 marks the 50th anniversary of the tragic assassination, on April 4th, of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. The philosophies of utilitarianism and Dr. King are not often linked together, but there are some fascinating and vital filiations, particularly in connection with Sidgwick. As I put it in my introduction to the Etica & Politica book symposium on de Lazari-Radek and Singer’s The Point of View of the Universe:

The great champion of the non-violent civil rights movement, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., titled his last book Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? In that work, King was explicit in expanding the range of his concerns to larger issues of social justice, to the issues of war and poverty. As events in the U.S. and across the world demonstrate, King’s question and concerns are as important as ever. Racial justice remains an aspiration, and community a dream. What King did
not appreciate or anticipate was the degree to which a secular philosophy such as Sidgwickian utilitarianism could support such movements as that for effective altruism, which he would have celebrated, or for animal liberation, which his leading influence, Gandhi, would have celebrated. That foundational work in academic moral philosophy could produce such social movements, and a consciousness of and concern with “the life you can save,” would have delighted King, and perhaps made him reconsider the potential of a secular philosophical ethics in advancing the “beloved community.” (Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics (2016) https://www.openstarts.units.it/bitstream/10077/12706/1/GUEST%20EDITORS.pdf).

King, like Sidgwick, would sometimes quote Tennyson’s In Memoriam:

\begin{quote}
Behold, we know not anything;  
I can but trust that good shall fall  
At last—far off—at last, to all,  
And every winter change to spring.
\end{quote}