Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, 2005, 1
http://www.units.it/etica/2005_1/SPIELTHENNER.htm
What Makes Actions Morally Good?
Department of Philosophy
and Applied Ethics
Abstract
When we evaluate
actions from the moral point of view, we can do this in two very different
ways. We can consider them as morally right or wrong, but we can also
judge them morally good or bad. Even though the distinction between
right and good is generally recognized by moral philosophers, there is a
tendency in contemporary ethics either to oversimplify it or to blur it
altogether. Most philosophers focus on motives when they investigate this
problem. I will, however, show that there are also other good–making factors
and moreover, I will argue that all of them are traits of the agent’s
personality. To this aim, I will in Sections (I) to (III) show that the moral
worth of actions depends on more than motivation or the agent’s character, and
in (IV) I will argue that no factors other than personality
traits determine the moral worth of actions. |
Actions can be evaluated in various respects. When we
evaluate them from the moral point of view, we can do this in two very
different ways. We can consider them as morally right or wrong, but we
can also judge them morally good or bad. Both evaluations are logically
independent of each other and David Ross was certainly right when he emphasized
that a clear distinction between the morally right and the morally good ‘will
do much to remove some of the perplexities of our moral thought.’ (1) The study of right and wrong action has been dominated by the
opposition between teleology (consequentialism) and deontology. According to
teleologists, the right–making qualities of actions are only their
consequences. This has been denied by deontologists who insist that an action can
be right or wrong in itself. If a physician tells a patient the truth
about his incurable disease, teleologists will judge the rightness or wrongness
of this action by referring only to its consequences. A deontologist, on the
other hand, may insist that it was right because truth–telling is intrinsically
right, quite independently of its consequences. It is, however, obvious that
the physician can tell the patient the truth for different reasons. If he is
malicious, he may want to plunge him into despair; but he can inform his
patient also out of benevolence, for instance, to give him the opportunity to
prepare himself and his family for the worst. Despite their disagreement
about the right–making factors, the teleologist and the deontologist will agree
that the action is morally bad if done for the former reason, but morally good
if done from the latter. (2)
Even though the distinction between the right and the good
is philosophers generally recognized among moral, there is a tendency in
contemporary ethics either to oversimplify it or to blur it altogether. (3) For this reason, I will in this paper
investigate what kinds of factors make actions morally good or bad. Of course,
it is not only actions that are good or bad but also motives, intentions,
emotions, or personal character, but since I am concerned about the distinction
between the morally right and the morally good, I will focus here only on
actions.
When philosophers deal with the problem of the morally
good, they tend to concentrate on motives. I will, however, show that there are
also other good–making factors and moreover, I will argue that all of them are
traits of the agent’s personality. I will thus defend the thesis that the moral
goodness of actions depends solely on personality traits of the agent. To this
aim, I will in Sections (I) to (III) show that the moral worth of actions
depends on more than motivation or the agent’s character, and in (IV) I
will argue that no factors other than personality traits
determine the morality of an action.
The purpose of this essay is thus quite limited. My aim is
only to examine the kind of factors that are relevant to the moral goodness of
actions. I do not intend to determine, for instance, which motives make actions
good or which character–traits render them bad. This problem is very complex
and its analysis goes far beyond the scope of a paper. However, my meta–ethical
inquiry is not only a prerequisite for successful investigations of these
normative ethical problems; it can also counteract the too restricted view
about the moral goodness of actions widespread in contemporary philosophy.
I
It seems that most philosophers regard the motives
of a person as factors that make her action morally good or bad. Apparently,
some of them think that the motives are the only relevant factors for an
action’s moral worth; (4) others consider them as
very important for this kind of moral evaluation, but not as exclusively
relevant. (5) It is obvious that motives are important
for the morality of an action. If a person spends money in order to help
innocent civilians in a war–torn country, her motivation tends to make her
action morally good. But if she spends the money only because she regards it as
a lucrative investment, her action may be prudent but it would not be seen as
morally praiseworthy. And if someone turns his radio up only to disturb his
neighbour, he will be rightly blamed, but if he does this only because he likes
loud music, his action is less blameworthy, even though not entirely morally
flawless (as will be apparent shortly).
The intention of an action is often not
distinguished from its motive. Both concepts are related but they are not
identical. (6) A simple example can show this. If A
puts poison into B's coffee with the intention to kill him, his motive
may have been the hope to inherit B's wealth. Obviously, intentions are
also relevant for the moral worth of our actions. (7)
Oedipus intentionally killed an old man but unintentionally his father. If he
had killed his father intentionally, we would judge his deplorable action
differently. However, since the arguments put forward to show the moral
relevance of intentions are not substantially different from those referring to
motives, it is not necessary to treat intentions here separately. In what
follows, I will show that it is not only motives (and intentions) that
make actions morally good or bad.
Actions can be morally bad (to a certain extent) even if
their motives are good. Suppose that a person A does something because
she thinks it will make B happy. She is, however, aware that her action
will harm C and D. Ex hypothesi, A is only
motivated by her wish to make B happy. She is indifferent to C
and D. A is therefore acting from a good motive (her wish to make
B happy), but what she does is nevertheless not morally good. The reason
for this is not her motive, but rather the lack of certain motives. (8) It is thus implausible to claim that only
motives make action morally good or bad. If this view was correct, the good
motive in our example would have rendered the action morally good and the
motives that are lacking could not have made the action bad. But what
made this action bad was the very fact that certain motives were absent.
Ross (1939, 325–6) rightly emphasizes therefore that many actions are morally
bad even though their motives are not blameworthy. Thefts, for example, are usually
not committed out of malevolence, but are often solely motivated by the wish to
get money and valuables. This motive, however, is morally neutral.
Nevertheless, such thefts are morally bad because something is missing.
The thieves are acting morally blameworthy because of their indifference or
negligence. (9) They are not (or not sufficiently)
motivated by their knowledge that they harm others.
That the morality of an action is not only
determined by its intention is shown by the fact that unintentional
actions can also be morally blameworthy. (10)
Not all actions are done intentionally. If I sit at a dining table, reach out
for my wine glass and by doing so knock over the vase, I have (on one description
of this action) broken the vase. However, I did it unintentionally. My
intention was to take my wine glass. Nevertheless, this unintentional action
can also be morally blameworthy. Since my intention to take the glass was not
morally bad and my breaking the vase was done unintentionally, it cannot have
been my intention that made my action blameworthy. I will be blamed because I
was careless. I was not sufficiently motivated to avoid a possible damage, and
it is this lack of a certain motivation that makes my action blameworthy. I did
not break the vase in order to get something or in order to
prevent something. There was thus also no motive for my breaking the vase. If
it was nevertheless morally blameworthy, then the moral worth of actions does not
just depend on the intentions and the motives involved.
II
Since it cannot be the motives or intentions alone that
make actions morally good or bad, some authors take the view that it is the
agent’s character which is decisive for the moral worth of his deeds. (11) Even though they define the concept of
character quite differently, most authors agree that a person’s character is
motivational in the sense that it affects her behaviour. If a person is
greedy, this character–trait will have an effect on the way she behaves; and it
is only because we observe that this person acts in various situations in a
certain way that we deem ourselves justified to call her greedy. Even though
there is a relation between our character and our motivation, both must be
clearly distinguished. (12) This can easily be
seen if we consider the fact that we can be motivated to do something without
having the corresponding character–trait (we can sometimes tend to spend much
money even though we are not wasteful) and we can have a certain
character–trait without always showing the corresponding motivation (even an
extravagant person can sometimes want to save money). We can also see this
distinction when we consider two different ways of explaining actions,
namely motive–explanations and character–explanations. A motive–explanation
refers to an aim of the agent, that is, to something he wants to get or to
avoid. In a character–explanation, however, there is no reference to aims or
goals. If we say that A saves money in order to buy a car, we give a
motive–explanation. But if we say that A saves money because he is
thrifty, we give a character–explanation. (13) A
person’s character must therefore be distinguished from her motivation. In what
follows, then, I will briefly discuss some examples to show that we do
often judge actions morally good or bad on the basis of the agent’s character.
Many people put other persons’ lives at risk. They do not
intend this (mostly, they are not malicious) and sometimes they even do not
believe that they might harm others, but in fact, their behaviour endangers
other persons’ lives. (14) Examples of this
moral recklessness can be seen with drivers on our roads. When drivers
overtake, they often do it in ways that objectively put others at risk. They
do not consciously want to harm them. However, although they are usually aware
that their risky driving may endanger others, they nevertheless overtake, for
instance, on a bend. This recklessness is not a motive of their behaviour (they
do not overtake in order to put someone at risk); it is rather a
character–trait of these drivers. If we blame them because of their
recklessness, we do not refer to their motivation but to a trait of character;
and to call some overtaking manoeuvres reckless means to condemn certain
actions on the basis of the agent’s underlying character and not because of
their motives.
Actions that are the result of negligence are also
morally blameworthy. (15) We often deserve
blame because we do not reflect carefully enough on our actions, both
evaluatively and factually. Let us first consider evaluative moral
negligence. A person may believe that we must never lie, and since she wants to
do what is morally right, she never lies. However, this person’s conduct can
nevertheless be morally blameworthy (to a certain extent) if she does not
bother to consider carefully whether we really must tell the truth or not at
all times. It is not the motive that renders her action blameworthy because the
motive is to do what she regards to be morally right and such conscientious
actions are generally considered to be morally good. The problem is her
negligence in failing to consider carefully the question whether we really
ought always to tell the truth. This negligence, however, is not a motive of
the agent; it is rather one of her character–traits, and it this trait we refer
to in our moral evaluation.
We can, however, also be morally negligent with regard to
the facts. We do usually consider some consequences of our actions but
often we act without proper thought. We consider, for instance, only some
effects of our deeds and we do not consider carefully how serious and how likely
others might be. If, for instance, we face a serious moral problem such as an
abortion and if we are careless about the consequences, it is obvious that our
action is blameworthy. But the moral relevance of negligence can even be seen
when we consider cases that are more ordinary. If somebody walks his dog but
does not, or not carefully enough, consider how the dog will react to cyclists
and children playing, his action is blameworthy even if the dog does not attack
anybody. What he does is morally reprehensible because he was too careless
about the possible consequences of his behaviour. Once again, it is not the
motivation that is bad. His motives might have been to relax and to take the
dog for a walk. There is nothing wrong with this motivation. If we blame him
nonetheless, we do so because of his negligence, that is, on account of a trait
of his character; and if we morally reprehend his behaviour by calling
it careless, we do this again by referring to his character.
We act thoughtlessly if we show a lack of concern
about the possible consequences of our actions. Some people give noisy parties
and apparently do not spare a thought for their neighbours. They deserve moral
blame for something they fail to do, namely show concern about how their
actions might affect others. Their motive, however, is not bad. They just want
to enjoy themselves. Moral thoughtlessness is a character–trait, and to judge
thoughtless behaviour as morally bad means to blame it because it is an
expression of this blameworthy trait.
There is a similar problem with regard to ignorance.
(16) It has a twofold effect on the morality
of an action. On the one hand, it can be an excuse. This means, if an action is
done out of ignorance, it is less blameworthy than it would have been if
the agent had known the relevant facts. On the other hand, doing something in
spite of ignorance can make an action morally worse. If someone is
shooting at game in a populated area and accidentally kills a shepherd, it is
not an adequate defence to say that he did not know that there were shepherds
in the field tending their sheep. He should have made sure that they were not
there. It is, however, not his ignorance as such that is blameworthy. We blame
him rather because he pursued his hobby even though he was ignorant about
whether his shooting might endanger someone. If we reprehend such a man and
his behaviour, we do it not because of his motivation but because of his
carelessness and his negligence in failing to acquire the relevant knowledge;
that is, because of a character–trait.
If somebody justifiably believes that she should do a
certain action from the moral point of view, but does not do it because
something else is more important for her, her action is morally blameworthy
(to a certain extent). (17) For instance, if a
person believes that she is morally required to spend a considerable part of
her income on the education of her children but does not do so because she
prefers to spend her money on the latest fashion, then her action is morally
reprehensibly. The reason for this, however, is neither that spending money on
fashion is as such morally wrong nor that the motivation to do so is
intrinsically morally bad. What makes her behaviour morally blameworthy is
rather the preponderance of her non–moral (not immoral) motive over her
moral motive. We base our moral evaluation of her behaviour on an imbalance
that prompts her to attach too little importance to moral consideration. This
again is related to character.
At this juncture, I should mention the so–called weakness
of the will (akrasia). Roughly said, a person shows weakness of the
will if she does intentionally what she believes she should not do, all things
considered. That is, an akratik person does something that she regards
as wrong (or does not what she considers right) even though she does not want
to do it (or does want to do it); and the reason for this is usually that she
cannot resist her present desires and emotions. (18)
This weakness of character also has an influence on the morality of an action
which can be illustrated by a simple example. A smoker can feel morally obliged
to abandon his habit, for instance, because it is a health hazard also for other
people, and he will thus be motivated to some extent to stop smoking. But he
can be overwhelmed by his craving for another cigarette and may thus be unable
to give it up. There is, however, no reason to criticise his motivation; it
will even be regarded as morally good. This means that we do not blame his
smoking on the basis of his motives but because of the agent’s character.
Telling someone that he is acting intemperately is a negative evaluation which
is based on the character of the agent that led to this action.
III
The examples given in Section II show sufficiently that we
often refer to character when we judge an action to be morally good or bad.
However, some further examples will show that the moral worth of an action is
also influenced by factors that do not pertain to character; and from
this it follows that character is not the basis of all moral evaluations
of actions.
It is widely recognized in philosophy and in everyday life
that emotional reactions are relevant for the moral evaluation of
persons. We judge a person ceteris paribus more negatively when she is
pleased about someone’s harm than when she feels sorry for him. However,
emotions also have an effect on the evaluation of the moral worth of actions.
(19) If somebody does not help an injured
person out of fear of doing something wrong, this emotion is an excuse for his
omission. His behaviour is therefore less blameworthy; and from this it follows
that an emotion such as fear has an influence on the morality of our behaviour.
In addition, emotions also affect our thinking. (20)
If a person is angry, she may interpret a situation differently than she would
have had she been relaxed. For example, if in a moment of anger someone
considers a person’s request as an impertinence and gives her therefore very
short shrift, her behaviour can be partly excused by referring to her emotional
condition. This shows again the effect of emotions on the moral evaluation of
actions. However, emotions are not part of our character; they are a component
of our personality. (21)
If we want to determine the basis on which we evaluate actions as morally good
or bad, we must therefore refer to the broader concept of personality which
includes, among other things, character and emotions.
Habits are not aspects of our character
but of our personality. They must therefore be distinguished not only from
motives and intentions, but also from character–traits. If somebody has the
habit of staying up late, he does not do it in order to reach one of his goals.
He may have had a goal at the time he started staying up late, but as soon as
this has become a habit, his goals are not any longer sufficient to explain
this behaviour. Habits are thus different from motives and intentions. But they
are also different from traits of character. This can be shown by the following
observation: When our actions are based on our character, we decide to
do them. However, when we do something habitually, we do not decide to
do it. If I have the habit of locking my front door, I do not decide each time
to lock it; I do it almost without thinking. However, if I lock the door
because I am wary (a trait of character), I do decide each time to lock it. (22) Our habits also have an impact on the
morality of our actions. This can be seen when we consider this simple example:
John has the habit of slamming the door of his car when he drives off early in
the morning. In winter, this habit does not disturb his neighbours’ sleep
because they have their windows closed, but in summer, it rudely awakens them
every day. It seems to me obvious that John’s slamming the door of his car is
morally less blameworthy than it would have been if he had not slammed it
habitually but with the intention to disturb his neighbours. I do not claim
that habits always have such a mitigating effect, but the example shows that
habits sometimes have an influence on our moral evaluation of actions. (23)
Mental disorders also are
relevant to the moral goodness and badness of actions. For instance, persons
who suffer from compulsions are not only a burden on themselves but their
behaviour can also be very irritating to other people. If someone is persistently
controlling whether everything in his apartment is exactly in the place it is
supposed to be, his behaviour can be very disturbing for his family. But if we
are told that he suffers from a compulsive disorder, this information will
change our moral evaluation. If his compulsion is very severe, it may even be
inappropriate to evaluate his behaviour morally at all. In both cases, his
mental disorder influences our moral evaluation. However, compulsions are not
traits of our character; they are aspects of our personality. We refer
therefore also in this and similar cases to personality when we evaluate the
moral worth of an action. (24)
I think that these examples suffice to show that we refer
not only to motives and the agent’s character when we judge actions morally
good or bad but also to traits of personality. “Personality” is a broader
concept than “character”. It encompasses the latter (all traits of character
are thus personality–traits) but it includes also motives, emotions, habits,
mental disorders, and other aspects. (25) I
therefore hold the view that we refer finally to the personality of an agent
when we judge his actions as morally good or bad; or, in other words, that it
is the agent’s personality which renders his actions morally good or bad.
IV
The account presented here could be objected to by
referring to E. Beardsley’s thesis that the circumstances of an action
are also relevant to its moral goodness. (26)
She distinguishes between two kinds of moral goodness, i.e. ‘moral worth’ and
‘moral credit’, and she claims that both are judged according to two different
standards that are not reducible to each other. An action’s ‘moral worth’ is
judged on the basis of the agent’s motives and character. However, if we
evaluate the ‘moral credit’ of an action, we refer to its circumstances. These
circumstances can be divided into internal ones (e.g. the agent’s
intellectual and emotional condition or his special faculties) and external
ones (e.g., the social milieu of a person or her financial situation). We can
take the well–known biblical story of the poor widow’s offering as an example
to illustrate the importance of the external circumstances (the internal ones
are no problem for my account because they are aspects of the personality). (27) Even though the widow gave very little
money, she was praised because she gave in spite of her poverty, that is,
despite difficult external circumstances. But poverty is not a personality
trait and this seems to show that factors that are not part of the agent’s
personality are relevant to the moral goodness of actions.
However, in my view, external circumstances are relevant to
the moral goodness of actions if, and only if, we can draw conclusions from
them relating to the agent’s personality. The following twofold argument will
show why I think so. (a) Two persons A and B donate the same
amount of money to a relief organization (e.g. for a worldwide polio vaccination
campaign that aims to eradicate this disease) and both have the same motive,
namely, to help children. Their action has therefore the same ‘moral worth’. We
are then told that A is very affluent while B is badly off.
According to Beardsley, B's action has a greater ‘moral credit’ because
of the adverse external circumstances of her donation. However, it seems to me
obvious that what renders her action morally better are not these circumstances
as such. They are only relevant because they allow us to draw conclusions with
reference to B's character. We can infer from A's action that he
is not entirely indifferent to some others and that he is willing to help them.
B's donation allows us to draw the same conclusion. Furthermore,
however, it shows that she is prepared to make sacrifices for others and it is
because of this additional quality that we judge B's action morally
better than A's. The external circumstances are thus only relevant
because they allow us to conclude to a trait of B; we can call it
‘willingness to make sacrifices’, and we judge B's action morally better
because it exhibits this trait. (b) When we have no information about
the financial means of A and B, but know, for instance, only that
they are forty–one and forty–two years old respectively, we will evaluate the
moral goodness of their donation equally. We do so because this information
does not allow us to draw conclusions with reference to their characters
and since it does not allow such inferences, it is not relevant
to the moral goodness of the action.
The first part of this argument indicates that external
circumstances are relevant for the morality of actions if they allow
conclusions with reference to the agent’s character. The second part gives a
reason for the belief that circumstances are not relevant if they do
not allow such conclusions. Both parts together, therefore, support my
thesis that external circumstances are relevant for the moral goodness of
actions if and only if they allow conclusions with reference to the
agent’s personality. Beardsley’s thoughts are interesting and important for the
problem of moral evaluations. However, they do not refute my thesis that it is
personality which basically renders our actions morally good or bad.
(2) It may be
objected that Kant would not consider an action morally good if it is done out
of benevolence. But most deontologists do not share Kant's moral rigorism and
regard also benevolence as a good–making property (see, for instance, Ross,
1930).
(3) See, for
instance, Slote (2001). Even though he claims that his virtue ethics can make
this distinction in a correct way, it in fact obscures it, which is in my view
an unavoidable consequence of his ‘agent–based’ approach.
(4) See e.g. Brandt (1996), Frankena (1980; 1981), Gibbard
(1990), Hossenfelder (2000), McInerny (1997), Nowell–Smith (1957) or von Wright
(1993).
(5)
Cf., for instance, Blum (1980), Broad (1949; 1971; 1985) or
Ewing (1953).
(6) Many
authors stress the difference between intentions and motives. However, they
distinguish them in very different ways. See, for instance, Anscombe (1963),
Bennet (1995), Broad (1985), Heckhausen (1977), McClelland (1987), Runggaldier
(1996) or von Wright (1963; 1983). It would, however, require too much space,
to discuss these differences.
(7) See to
this also Frankena (1980, 49), Hutcheson (1986, 162–3) or A. Smith (1994,
137–65). As already mentioned, intentions can also be the objects of our moral
evaluations, but in this paper I will focus only on actions.
(8) See Ross
(1939, 306–7).
(9) Cf. also
Milo (1984, 140–84).
(10) See to
this also Bennett (1995, 195) and Broad (1985, 63).
(11) D. Ross
(1930, 155), for instance, claims that morally good is only what is a certain
sort of character or is related to a certain sort of character in one of
certain ways …’ (see also p. 161); and Nowell–Smith (1957) writes: ‘[A] breach
of a moral rule is only considered culpable when it is attainable to the
agent’s character …’ (p. 265); see also Brandt (1959), Hospers (1970) and Ross
(1939).
(12) Cf. to
this, for instance, John and Gosling (2000) and McAdams (1995).
(13) Compare
to this Alston (1967, 400) and Nowell–Smith (1957, 111).
(14) See Milo
(1984, 98).
(15) Compare,
for instance, Milo (1984, 82–114) and A. Smith (1984, 155–58).
(16) See, for example, Aristotle EN 1113b30 – 1114a3), Koch
(1907, 119) or Nowell–Smith (1957, 256–62).
(17) Cf. Milo (1984, 185–218).
(18) Cf., for instance, Milo (1984, 115–39) who
distinguishes different kinds of akrasia. A more precise explanation is given
by Davidson (1969) who explains akratik actions as follows: ‘In doing x
an agent acts incontinently [akratik] if and only if (a) the agent does x
intentionally; (b) the agent believes there is an alternative action y
open to him; and (c) the agent judges that, all things considered, it would be
better to do y than to do x’ (p. 94).
(19) Cf. to this e.g. Adams (1988), Broad (1985, 185–6),
Hutcheson (1986, 136–61) and Oakley (1992, 53). See also Aristotle EN 1106 b
15–29.
(20) See, for example, Izard (1991, 70–2) or Oakley (1992).
(21)
See, for instance, Izard (1991; 1993) or Pervin (1993;
2000).
(22) See to this also Brandt (1988, 76) and Nowell–Smith
(1957, 108–9).
(23) Cf. also Koch (1907, 120–1) and von Wright (1963,
143).
(24) I have mentioned here only some examples of
personality traits. There are, however, many others that also contribute to the
moral worth of our actions; for instance, intelligence, extraversion, anxiety,
or neuroticism. As said, it goes far beyond the scope of this paper to
investigate how they influence moral goodness. For my present purposes
it is only important to show that personality traits have an effect on
the morality of actions.
(25) This is the case if we understand the character of a
person as is usual in philosophy and psychology. Some, however, define
“character” so broadly that it does not substantially differ from
“personality”. For instance, Blum (1980) claims that character is ‘a kind of
totality which encompasses ways of behaving, attitudes, and emotions’ (p. 205),
which means that ‘character' and ‘personality’ have more or less the same
meaning. I think, however, that this is an unduly broad definition.
(26) See Beardsley (1957; 1970).
(27) See Mark
12. 41–44 and Luke 21. 1–4.
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