Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics, 2004, 2
http://www.units.it/etica/2004_2/SAMARZJIA.htm
Embryo Experimentation and Sorites
Paradoxes
|
Abstract The most influential opponents of the
embryo research and embryo experimentation claim that a person with the rights
to life begins to exist at the moment of fertilization. They argue that such a
scientific practices are tantamount to murder and, therefore, that thy are
absolutely morally and legally impermissible The advocates of such a viewpoint
appealed most frequently to three arguments with the purpose of supporting the
stance that fertilization should be nominated as the time at which full moral
status is acquired: (i) Genetical Argument – at the “moment” of fertilization a genetically
human being is created, (ii) Continuity Argument – in the post-fertilization
period a continuum of developmental changes is such that it is impossible to
isolate any stage to which we could attribute the attainment of moral status,
(iii) Individuality Argument – it is the same individual right through
from the moment of fertilization until the end. This
article considers exclusively the question whether the Continuity Argument
really supports the approach according to which fertilization is a determinant
of moral status. I will try to show that from the most persuasive
interpretation of Continuity Argument does not follow: (1) that the
fertilization is necessary determinant of moral status; (2) that the
fertilization is the most reasonable determinant of moral status. In short, I
will try to show that this very argument does not entail the stance that embryo
research and embryo experimentation are morally impermissible. |
The
development of biotechnology imposed to us numerous extremely complex ethical
dilemmas. One of the most important question relevant for the wide spectrum of
scientific and medical procedures such as, for instance, embryo research and
experimentation, assisted reproductions practices, cloning to abortion are:
When does a person begin to exist? In other words, is there, at some time
during prenatal development, a crucial “marker event” before which there is no
being to whom we have a moral obligation, and after which, there is? Is there
any determinant of the moral status of person (prenatal or postnatal) and is it
attainable by our cognitive capacities? It is far beyond the purpose of this
article to consider all these questions and all these medical procedures.
However, I will try to contribute to this important debate by discussing one
rather precise question: should we nominate fertilization as a marker event on
the basis of the Continuity Argument?
The
main aim of this article is to analyse the Continuity Argument, one of the
arguments on which is grounded the moral condemnation of embryo research and
experimentation. In the first part, I will give a very brief account of the
approach that attributes the status of marker event to fertilisation. I will
focus in this paper exclusively on the Continuity Argument in favour of fertilization
approach, offering three possible interpretation of it. Finally, I will just
register certain scientific facts that may call into question the first two
interpretations. In the second part, I will isolate and analyze the third and
the most persuasive interpretation of Continuity Argument. However, I will try
to show that from this scientifically and philosophically well grounded
interpretation of Continuity Argument does not follow: (1) that the
fertilization is necessary determinant of moral status; (2) that the
fertilization is the most reasonable determinant of moral status. In short, I
will try to show that this very argument does not entail the stance that embryo
experimentation and research are morally impermissible. It has to be stressed that
I will not argue here that such a conclusion implies that fertilization could
not be a marker event or that more convincing arguments in favour of
fertilization approach could not be offered.
I
Embryo Experimentation and
Fertilization as a Marker Event
In what follows, I shall concentrate exclusively on
the problem of moral justification of early embryo research and experimentation
(what is closely connected with the justification of the medical practice of in
vitro fertilization or therapeutic cloning). In other words, I will refer
primarily to the problem of embryo experimentation in its earliest stage before
the appearance of the primitive streak. Namely, at least in the last decade the
majority of polemics about the moral and legal permissibility of embryo
research is focused on this period of the first fourteen days after
fertilization and before the formation of the primitive streak. Limiting my
discussion on this early period of embryo development, I do not want to suggest
that the day 14 is the definitive borderline after which any research is
forbidden, but only that there are some good arguments against the moral
impermissibility of embryo experimentation before this term (1).
The moral judgment about the permissibility of a
research or experimentation on an embryo requires an answer to the question
when does a person with a right to life and the other moral rights begin to
exist. Consequently, the debate is focused on the searching for the marker
event or the event that determinate the moral status (2). Various landmarks in prenatal development are
nominated as this marker event that determines a full moral status such as
fertilization, segmentation, viability, capacity to have an experience, the
sentiments of adults, social visibility, the constitution of large multiple
connected cerebral cortex, the ability for rational reasoning, consciousness,
self-motivated activity, etc (3).
The main opponents of the embryo research and
experimentation claim that conception or fertilization is a crucial moment in
prenatal development (4). According to this very influential viewpoint that a
person with the rights to life of an adult begins to exist at the moment of
fertilization, the practices of embryo experimentation and embryo research are
tantamount to murder and, therefore, absolutely impermissible. Fertilization is
not exactly a moment but a complex process (lasting about 24 hours) initiated
by the incorporation of the sperm in the egg, after which the egg completes
maturation, the genetic material of each condenses into chromosomes, and
finally the male and the female contributions come together to form the new genotype (5). Historically,
the opponents of practices such as embryo experimentation have appealed most
frequently to this fact about the formation of a new genetic code. It is
concluded that fertilization marks the beginning of a genetically unique human
life and therefore the beginning of a new individual, a person with all the
rights of an adult and that it is wrong to destroy such an individual life
because of what it currently is (6). However,
in more recent discussions this general argument is divided into three
arguments with the purpose of supporting the stance that fertilization should
be nominated as the time at which full moral status is acquired: (i) Genetical Argument – at the “moment” of
fertilization a genetically human being is created; (ii) Continuity Argument –
in the post-fertilization period a continuum of developmental changes is such
that it is impossible to isolate any stage to which we could attribute the
attainment of moral status, (iii) Individuality Argument – it is the
same individual right through from the moment of fertilization until the end (7).
I
will focus in this paper only on the second, Continuity Argument, and try to
show that there are serious scientific and philosophical obstacles to inferring
from the assumptions of this Argument the stance that fertilization is a
determinant of moral status.
Continuity
Argument
What is exactly argued by this argument? The proponents of this argument view post-fertilization development as a continuous process in which there is no any event to which it is possible to attribute the nomination of a marker event. In contrast to this post-fertilization continuity, fertilization is seen as a crucial discontinuity or “transformation” in development (8).
It
has to be noticed that in the literature there are certain terminological
ambiguities concerning this argument that provokes further confusion. Namely,
three interpretations of various strengths can be detected: (i) the strongest
claim is that continuity implies the denial of any genetic and numerical
developmental changes in the post-fertilization process; (ii) the moderate
claim does not exclude some developmental changes, but it is argued that the
continuity means that there are no crucial
changes in the sense of discontinuity or relevant
“transformation” in development; (iii) the weakest version is the claim that
the post-fertilization process is continuous in the sense that there is no one
single moment identifiable as a marker event, but that development after
fertilization is a gradual process. In short, according to the first
interpretation of the Continuity Argument, after fertilization there are no
genetical and numerical changes; according to the second interpretation, there
are some changes, but these changes are not crucial discontinuity events in
comparison with fertilization; and according to the third interpretation, it is
allowed that there are developmental changes, perhaps some of them could be
crucial, but it is not possible to isolate one single moment to which the
attribution of discontinuity could be ascribed. Regardless of these different
versions of the Continuity Argument, the conclusion is the same: the continuity
of post-fertilization development is the reason why we have to ascribe to
fertilization a status of marker event.
If
we tend to a systematic elaboration of the foundation for the moral
condemnation of embryo research based on Continuity Argument, each of these
three interpretations has to be considered apart from each other.
1. Continuity without any
Changes. According to the first, initial
and most demanding interpretation of Continuity Argument, any variations during
or subsequent to fertilization is not allowed. This interpretation of the
continuity of post-fertilization development is understood as a natural
implication of the stance that the genotype is definitely formed at the moment
of fertilization and can be found primarily at the proponents of genetical
argument (9). However, two standard forms of such an
interpretation Continuity Argument have to be distinguished: (i) genetical Continuity Argument and (ii) numerical Continuity Argument. On the
one hand, the notion of genetical continuity means that in the post-fertilization
period there are no developmental changes in the genotype, i.e. that there is
genetical continuity between embryo and me. On the other hand, it is claimed
that there is no numerical discontinuity in the post-fertilization period, that
is, that fertilization results with the final formation of a single entity.
This means that there is a numerical continuity between the embryo and me. I
will briefly register some scientific facts that could call into question such
an interpretation of both genetical and numerical continuity.
On the one side, scientific research does not support the conclusion about the lack of genetic changes after fertilization. In spite of a certain terminological indeterminacy concerning the notion of genetic change, such a Continuity Argument, in principle, assumes that genetic make-up is something static and constant from the moment of fertilization that crucially determines all further prenatal and postnatal development. Scientists stress a certain overemphasizing of the role of genetics in directing the course of events after fertilization. The dependence on the fidelity of a new genotype formed at fertilization throughout all subsequent development is limited. Scientific research suggests that differentiation is a dynamic process and that the environment contributes to subtle continuous changes throughout a whole lifetime. The genotype of any individual may not be that which is formed at fertilization. Environment is a potential force in the course of development both pre-natally and post-natally. Successful completion of fertilization in no way assures development through to birth or even the commencement of embryo development (10).
On
the other side, scientists have generally dismissed the numerical Continuity
Argument based on the equation: 1 egg + 1 sperm = 1 embryo =1 individual. The
formation of a single zygote or early embryo in the fertilization may be the
forerunner of the development of multiple identical individuals. It is not
necessary that an early embryo marks the beginning of a human entity that is
numerically continuous throughout all subsequent development. For instance,
identical twins arise from a single embryo that splits around 14 days in about
one out of every 270 pregnancies coming to term. It is worth noticing that it
has been estimated that a significant proportion of identical twins are lost
either through spontaneous abortion, or the loss of one foetus which results in
singleton development and birth. Consequently, scientists suggest that the
twinning is not a rare phenomenon at all that can be interpreted as a kind of
deformation in post-fertilization period.
Early embryonic cells are totipotent what means that an early human
embryo has the potential to become one or more different individuals (11). There is
also an opposite phenomenon when two eggs are fertilized, two embryos (or
zygotes) and two genetic codes exist, but around the 6th day two embryos
combine forming a chimera and continue to develop as a single organism.
In
short, in spite of fact that these scientific comments have been only sketched
here, it seems that there are serious scientific challenges to the viewpoint or
even the myth of genetic determinism and numerical continuity.
2. Continuity without
Crucial Developmental Discontinuities.
According to the second interpretation, the theses about
continuity allow certain developmental changes, but not a crucial discontinuity
or “transformation” in development to which we can ascribe the attribute of
marker event (12). In spite of the lack of a precise meaning of
“discontinuity” or what it has to be seen as a discontinuity or developmental
transformation, it can be concluded, that, as well as the first interpretation,
scientific research does not unambiguously support this interpretation.
At
the beginning, it has to be stressed that fertilization may not necessarily
result with the formation of embryo. Namely, in the case of dispermy, in spite
of fertilization, the embryo is not formed. Also, it is worthwhile noting that
for up to 78% of human fertilizations the endpoint is loss rather than
progression to the next developmental stage (13). The fact
is that any other event or process after fertilization taken by theoreticians
as a marker event has a better statistics of further development. These
scientific findings absolutely do not prove that fertilization is not marker
event, but in the light of these facts, the claim about fertilization as the
crucial and unique discontinuity event in development of a human being probably
looses some initial intuitive strength.
Furthermore,
there are no convincing scientific and ethical arguments from the proponents of
fertilization approach against the possibilities that some other events or
processes could be taken as the crucial developmental transformations. For
instance, at least two processes in the post-fertilization development are
proposed by scientists as the processes that mark some important transformation
in the development of a human being: (i) segmentation and (ii) the formation of
a functioning cortex.
Segmentation
may be considered as the splitting of the embryo to form multiple identical
individuals, or the recombining of twins or triplets to form a single
individual. Twinning and chimera formation are complete at about 13 or 14 days
after fertilization, in the case of in vivo development, when the primitive
streak begins to form in the embryonic disc. Many philosophers defend the stance
that segmentation is the determinant of moral status or marker event because at
the completion of this stage there is no longer any possibility of segmentation
occurring and the single being becomes twins, triplets, etc (14). Some others do not hold
that segmentation is the determinant of moral status or the beginning of an
individual life with full moral status, but argue in favour of segmentation as
a beginning of particular human life (15). Also, some committees’ reports
about human (pre-)embryo experimentation have recommended that research using
in vitro human prenates should not be permitted beyond 14 days after
fertilization (16). Such stances coincide with
segmentation as the crucial discontinuity moment in the post-fertilization
period. In any case, the approach that defends the moderate kind of continuity
after fertilization overlooks the possibility that either twinning or
recombination may occur in the normal course of events, disrupting the
continuum of development and marking the important discontinuity event. It has
to be noticed that I will not here discuss the question whether segmentation is
beginning of a particular or individual life or it is not. I only want to
stress that the process of segmentation is in various scientific and
philosophical contexts recognized as an important discontinuity in
developmental process.
The second event or process that could
deserve a special status in the post-fertilization period is the formation of a
functioning cortex. The starting crude scientific fact is that the existence of
a large multiply connected cerebral cortex distinguishes human beings both
structurally and functionally from other forms of life. Some scientists have
made a further, perhaps more metaphysical step, recommending the stance to
philosophers that, therefore, our species acquire humanness when the enlarged
cortex has developed, and that the individual human foetus becomes a person
with the rights of an adult when the cortex begins to function (17). However, such a metaphysical claim is beyond this
kind of debate. My aim here is only to stress the fact that scientists find
that this change in post-fertilization development is important
discontinuity. Namely, science
teaches us that up to the end of the second trimester (or 24th week) of
pregnancy, nerve cells accumulate in the brain and differentiate, but until
that time a significant number of connections between those cells are not
formed. A pile of nerve cells is not a functioning cortex. It becomes a
functioning cortex when the system is “wired up” by synaptic connections, and
this process starts at around twenty-four weeks of gestation and continues into
childhood. Before the wiring up of the cortex, the foetus is simply incapable
of feeling anything, including pain. The signals may be sent by the nerves
earlier, but there is nothing to receive them. Once the synapses start forming,
however, this sort of categorical statement can no longer be made. Undoubtedly,
regardless of the question of personhood, such an event that marks the
beginning of feeling, or “wiring up” of the cortex, has to be a prime candidate
for the nomination of the discontinuity event in the development of a human
being.
It
is worthwhile to stress once more that in this case as well as in the previous
of segmentation, I do not argue in favour of any positions, but I only try to
stress that such events or processes, according to scientists, marks the important
discontinuities in the development. Therefore, the proponents of the second
interpretation should take into account that there are significant scientific
recommendations that in the post-fertilization process there are crucial
discontinuity events or processes and important developmental transformations.
3. Continuity as a Gradual
Process. According
to the third and less demanding interpretation, the notion of continuity means
that post-fertilization is a certain gradual process, that is, that we are incapable
of identifying one single moment as a marker event. This third interpretation
is the most usual interpretation of the Continuity Argument. In contrast to the
previous interpretations, it has to be noticed that this interpretation is
generally accepted both by scientists and by the majority of philosophers from
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas until today. Scientists have strong reasons to
believe that all biology is a matter of gradual change. Consequently, the
development of a human being is also gradual. Such a widespread consensual
viewpoint implies that in the post-fertilization development there is no one
single identifiable moment to which we could attribute the mark of marker
event. However, we will try to show that from this generally acceptable
formulation of Continuity Argument does not follow that the fertilization - the
beginning of the continuous process - is neither necessary nor the most
reasonable marker event. It could be argued that there are other morally
relevant reasons for the nomination of fertilization as a marker event. We hope
we will show here only that from this most convincing interpretation of
Continuity Argument does not follow that fertilization has to be ascribed with
such a nomination.
I I
Sorites
series and the problem of the arbitrary precisification
At
the beginning, let us consider in a more detailed manner why, from the thesis
about the continuity of post-fertilization development, it follows that we
cannot isolate one single moment as actually being a discontinuity event. It
can be useful to recall here the ancient notion of continuum. For instance,
according to Aristotle, continuum is a kind of coherence where coherence is
defined as that which touches when it is in sequence. Continuum is a species of
coherence, such as that both terms by which it is contained are one and the
same, and, as its name signifies, they are contained; but this cannot be when
there are two terms. Commenting on this passage of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas
says: “For when the ends of two things which touch are made one the same, that
is said to be a continuum. Continuum is derived from contained (continendum). When therefore many
parts are contained in one, that is, hold together as it were at the same time,
then there is continuum. (…) From this it follows further that there cannot be
continuation except in those things, from which a unity is made naturally by
contact.” (18) According
to this interpretation of continuity, the requirement for the identification of
one single moment as a certain borderline even contradicts the notion of continuous process as unity or
wholeness.
There
is also a certain weaker position according to which in continuous processes
any demarcation is arbitrary. Namely, it has to be noticed that in various
areas where we deal with the continuous processes or scales - in biology as
well as in any other domain- we deal with the sorites series. The requirement to identify a single moment
in sorites sequence leads to the sorites paradoxes (19) or to “the problem of
arbitrary precisification” (20). Sorites paradoxes seem to
have been introduced by the logician Eubulides of Miletus, a contemporary of
Aristotle. The most famous puzzles are Bald
Mann (i.e. the original
Falakros) and Heap (i.e.
originally Sorites). In
antiquity they were usually formulated as series of questions.
Let
us see the Heap: Does one grain of wheat make a heap? Do two grains of wheat
make a heap? Do three grains of wheat make a heap? Etc. Do ten thousand grains
of wheat make a heap? If someone admits that one grain does not make a heap,
and are unwilling to make a fuss about the addition of any single grain, he is
eventually forced to admit that ten thousand grains do not make a heap. Namely,
when someone at first denies that one grain makes a heap – which is the only
reasonable answer - he should later decide between two equally unacceptable
answers: that one grain makes a heap from a non-heap at some arbitrary point,
or to deny that ten thousand grains make a heap (21). As well as in the case of
the heap, the non-arbitrary identification of one single point as a marker
event is not possible in many other cases of continuous or gradual processes:
for instance, in the cases of tallness, baldness, strong wind, a mountain, a
city, the open sea, when an orange colour in a spectrum becomes red, etc. The
non-arbitrary isolation of the centimetre at which someone becomes tall or the
hair when someone becomes bald seems to be hopeless.
Similarly,
if we assume with the majority of scientists that post-fertilisation is a
continuous process, that is, a certain sorites sequence, the isolation of any
moment as a marker event would be arbitrary and it would lead us to the sorites
paradox. Since, we are not principally able to make a non-arbitrary
precisification of a crucial moment, we cannot isolate a single moment both in
prenatal and postnatal development as a marker event as well as we cannot find
out the moment that determines when childhood finishes and puberty begins, when
adolescence or maturity begins, etc (22). It can be objected here
that such an analogy between the cases of baldness or heap and the issues about
the beginning of the life of a person is ungrounded for two reasons: 1.) the
paradox is restricted only to quantitative processes like baldness, tallness or
the like, but not qualitative like post-fertilization development; 2.) there is
a great difference between baldness and personhood in terms of moral
importance.
However,
it seems to us that the paradox is not restricted exclusively to quantitative
processes. Any continuous process, “including those that referee to qualities
such as loudness or to stages of temporal development, are susceptible to the
sorites paradox” (23). For
instance, let us see how L.F. Kerckhove and S.Waller illustrate the
applicability of the sorites paradox to one qualitative process:
“1. An egg cooked for one second is not a hard
boiled egg.
2. Cooking
the egg one second longer will not affect its doneness.
3.
Therefore, an egg cooked for two seconds will not be hard boiled.
4. Repeat
steps (2)-(3).” (24)
Consequently,
any continuous or gradual biological process presents sorites series like
baldness, tallness but also loudness, red-orange continuum of colour patches,
temporal development, etc.
Secondly,
we are deeply aware of the difference in moral importance between the debate
about baldness and post-fertilization development, but we are here limited to
no other analogy except in the aspect of continuity. More precisely, while the
applicability of possible solutions of sorites paradox in the case of
personhood could be an object of moral concern, it seems that the mere
identification of the analogy between the different cases of continuous
processes cannot (25). The problem of moral evaluation
will be actualised later with a proposal we will offer.
Consequently,
for the sake of our present debate, we hold that the following reasoning is
legitimate:
In
the continuous processes or in the sorites series it is not possible to
non-arbitrarily isolate any single moment as a marker event.
Post-fertilization development is
continuous process.
Therefore, in the post-fertilization process it is not possible to non-arbitrarily isolate any single moment as the marker event (26).
Our
question will be now whether we should, therefore, with the proponents of
Continuity Argument, nominate fertilization - the beginning of the continuous
developmental process - as the marker event.
Non-sequitur
Should
we conclude with the advocates of the Continuity Argument that fertilization is
necessary
marker event because in the continuous process such as prenatal and postnatal
development the non-arbitrary precisification of one single moment is
impossible? It seems to us that Continuity Argument failed to support the
fertilization approach. More precisely, from the fact of the continuous
post-fertilization process it does not follow that fertilization itself must be
the marker event.
1.
SORITES PARADOX. When someone claims the Continuity Argument, or from the
continuous nature of post-fertilization development derives a conclusion that
fertilization – the very beginning of this continuous process - has to be the
marker event, they fall into a certain absurd conclusion or in the sorites
paradox. L.F. Kerckhove & S. Waller construed the following argument, which
illustrates the applicability of the sorites paradox in the case of a person:
“ 1. X is a person at age T, where T is twenty-one
years old.
2.If X is a person at age T, then X is
person at T-1 second.
3.Therefore, X is a person at T-1.
4.Repeat steps (2)- (3).
Using iterated modus ponens, we can eventually slide from the intuitively plausible claim that a twenty-one year old human being is a person to the much stronger claim that a newly fertilized ovum is a person.” (27)
To
nominate fertilization as the marker event would be absurd, like claiming that
someone becomes bald with the first hair he loses because we cannot isolate one
single moment or a hair when the baldness starts. In spite of the impossibility
that we non-arbitrarily isolate a moment when someone becomes bald, nobody can
seriously claim that a person becomes bald with the first hair he loses.
Similarly, to derive a claim about fertilization as a marker event from the
fact of continuity is like deriving that the first grain makes a heap, that
adolescence begins at conception or that the first drop makes an ocean. In
short, the inference according to which from the fact of continuous process
follows that the beginning of a process is the marker event, presents a clear
case of deficient and unacceptable inference.
2.
CONTINUITY DOES NOT IMPLY IDENTITY. It seems that the proponents of Continuity
Argument assume that if we have a person at some point in the continuous
process, due to continuity, we have to have a person also at the beginning of
this process. Let us consider such reasoning in a bit different way. What we
know is that twenty-one year old (perfectly physically and mentally healthy)
Mary is undoubtedly a person. There is no single participant in the discussion
about personhood who would say that twenty-one year old Mary is not a person.
Probably, when Mary was ten years old, she was a person as well. Perhaps she
was a person in her seventh year. Whatever we decide, twenty-one year old Mary
is an adult with all the rights of a person. Mary, who is twenty-one years old,
is physically continuous from the egg that was fertilized more than twenty-one
years ago, and from which she developed. However, it does not follow that she
became a person when the egg was fertilized. The mere physical continuity does
not imply necessary identity. For instance, Robert Lane who argues that
physical continuity does not imply even a numerical identity, wrote:
“(…) an early-term PBH (pre-born-human) is not sufficiently similar, either anatomically, physiologically, or psychologically, to the late term PBH, infant, or adult with which it is physically continuous, to be one and the same thing as any of them.” (28)
Accordingly,
it could be justifiable to say that in spite of the physical continuity of
process, things could be of one kind at some point in development and another at the beginning because they can
change their identity during this developmental process. The continuity of process
does not necessarily imply identity during the whole process. Someone can hold
that a person who is named Mary began to live from conception for some other
reasons. However, a mere physical continuity is surely not the reason to give
that we say that a twenty-one year old person was necessarily a person also at
the moment of fertilization.
In
short, from the facts that a twenty-one year old human being is a person and
that the process from fertilization to being a twenty-one year old person is
continuous, to derive that fertilization is the moment when this person began
to exist – is an obvious non sequitur.
The continuous process can be conceived as the process of gradual change during
which - in spite of the impossibility identifying any single moment as a marker
event - something that is not a person could become a person (as well as
during other sorites series a non-bald
person becomes bald, orange colour becomes red, etc.). It can be perfectly
justified to say that, in spite of the continuity of prenatal and postnatal
development, Mary over time gradually became a person from a non-person.
Fertilisation
as the most reasonable marker event
However,
it can be objected that such an interpretation of Continuity Argument – that
continuity necessary implies
that fertilization is the marker event – is a certain argument of a straw man.
Namely, it could be said that in Continuity Argument it is only assumed that it
is most reasonably to
take fertilization as a marker event.
The
two lines or argumentation in favour of such reasoning could be offered.
1. Since there is an impossibility to identify non-arbitrarily one single moment as a marker event, it would be the most reasonable in terms of moral concerns to nominate the fertilisation as a marker event. Namely, in the situation when the marker event is principally unattainable, attributing fertilization as the marker event we could prevent possible murders (29).
2. If we do not nominate fertilization, due to the continuity of the developmental process, it would be impossible to determine any marker event as a basis of moral and legal regulation. Namely, fertilization is the only salient event or the only clearly identifiable event in the developmental process. So, since moral and legal purposes impose on us the need for some event that can be nominated as a marker event, fertilization is not only a suitable marker event, but also – due to continuity - the only possible such event (30).
Let us notice that such reasoning would be justified only
under two stronger interpretations of continuity that reject the existence of
developmental changes, or at least the existence of crucial changes in the
post-fertilization development. If there are no changes, or no crucial changes,
any marker event in the post-fertilization period would be unreachable.
However, under the third interpretation according to which continuous
post-fertilization development is the process of gradual changes, such an argumentation
loses its basis. If we are right, under the assumption that the developmental
process is a process of gradual changes, fertilization is not the most
reasonable marker event.
In
the sorites series, from the fact that we cannot identify non-arbitrarily one
single point as a demarcation line it does not follow that we cannot know that
a person somewhere during the process of losing hair
becomes bald, or that we cannot know that the life of a person begins somewhere during
this continuous process. Namely, in spite of the fact that we cannot isolate
one single moment, we can isolate the zone
or area where the
crucial change happens.
Let
me elaborate this stance in more detail. Some scientists claim that we can be
perfectly sure that a person begins to live with a functioning cortex, and at
the same time that it is impossible to isolate one single moment as the moment
when the cortex becomes “wired up”. For instance, H.J. Morowitz and J.S. Trefil
claim that (i) the individual human fetus becomes a person with rights when the
cortex begins to function; (ii) the cortex becomes functioning when the system
is “wired up” by synaptic connections; (iii) this process starts at around twenty-four weeks of
gestation (31). Such an example
illustrates clearly that the continuity - the stance about the impossibility to
isolate non-arbitrarily one single moment as a marker event - does not imply the stance that we don’t know
when a person begins to live, or what are the features that make a person. In
other words, the thesis that it is not possible to identify a non-arbitrary
demarcation line as a marker event could be perfectly compatible with the
stance that, for instance, there is some zone or area of the cortex formation (or segmentation, or some
other) that can be the determinant of moral status.
In the general philosophical debate about sorites paradoxes, a certain solution that supports previous reasoning about the possibility to determine an area as the marker process has been already offered as certain pragmatical strategies that treat sorites-infected paradoxes (32). In spite of the fact that we cannot say exactly at which point someone becomes tall, bald, when the door is open or when an egg is hard boiled, we can perfectly distinguish a tall person from a small one, a bald person from one who is not bald, when a door is open or when an egg is hard boiled and when is not. In other words, in the sorites series the existence of change from a non-bald person to bald, from a non-heap to heap, from an orange colour in red, non-person to person is unquestionable. This suggests that, in spite of the impossibility to non-arbitrarily isolate a precise one single moment as a marker point, it could be possible to define a relevant sequence or simply a grey area in which the crucial change happens.
For
instance, in spite of the fact that we cannot isolate the centimetre when a
person becomes tall, all semantically competent speakers (who understand the
notion “tall” and who know how to use this notion) agree that a person of 160
cm is not tall while a person of 190 cm is tall. Terrence Horgan’s proposal of
relevant sequence can be applied here as a sort of pragmatical solution of the
sorites paradoxes because it can provide us with a workable solution concerning
the determination of a marker area in the continuous processes (33). Precisely,
when scientists and moral philosophers would agree about the features that make
a person, there will not be any principal obstacles to the isolation of a
relevant sequence, or grey area, to which they can attribute a nomination of
marker area (34). The line
can be simply drawn in the general area of the appearance of the morally
relevant feature. For instance, let us imagine that scientists and philosophers
make a consensus that the segmentation is a morally relevant developmental
change. As well, as we say that after 190 centimetres a person is tall, we
could say that after the day 14, any scientific intervention or research on
embryos is forbidden. Neither the 190 centimetres, nor day 14 is an arbitrary
line, but the end of the sequence after which the uncertainty disappears.
Namely, in the case of segmentation, the grey area finishes for sure at day 14
in in vivo development (and
even later in vitro
development) when the appearance of the primitive streak precludes the embryo
becoming two or more different individuals. Therefore, if the scientists and
moral philosophers would agree that segmentation (or the formation of a
functioning cortex or some other event) is a morally relevant change in
development, the fact about the continuity of developmental process would not
be an obstacle to determine one of these processes as a marker area. The line
that could be drawn at the end (or in the case of the cortex functioning, at
the beginning) of a general or grey area would be also completely reasonable
and a non-arbitrary line.
Morally
malign and benign arbitrariness
Someone
can now reasonably object that our proposal failed and that we have not escaped
from the arbitrariness because the lines that determine the beginning or the
end of grey areas must be also arbitrary. For instance, we chose the 160 cm and
190 cm as the borderlines of the grey area in which someone becomes tall.
Someone could, quite intelligibly, ask why not 159 cm and 188 cm? Moreover, we
could have been, and probably should have been more precise and chose the
sequence from 170cm-186cm. In the light of such reasoning, a kind of
arbitrariness in our proposal is inevitable. However, it seems to me that, in
contrast to the malign arbitrariness tat characterize sorites paradoxes, such
arbitrariness is of the morally
benign kind. In our example, it can be taken as granted in the highest possible
degree that nobody under 160 cm is tall and anybody over 190 cm is not tall.
Such arbitrariness is benign in the comparison of pointing, for instance, 184
cm as the demarcation line when someone becomes tall. There is no reason why
183cm or 186 cm instead of 184 cm are not chosen as demarcation lines. Namely,
we cannot conceive or imagine any explanatory basis that would single out some
unique candidate over against its competitors. It is definitely much more
accurate to say that someone becomes tall in the sequence from 160-190 cm, than
at 184 cm. The pragmatic solutions, as
well as this way of thinking about benign arbitrariness, is far more
appropriate in bioethical discussions where indifference about hypothetical
solutions is intolerable and where moral deliberation in each particular case
would minimize the possibility of mistakes.
Similarly,
under the assumption that the segmentation is the morally relevant
developmental change, day 14 can be chosen as the end of the relevant period
after which (in the case of in vivo
development) there is no any possibility for twinning or chimera formation
because the primitive streak definitely begins to form in the embryonic disc.
It should be stressed here that the dynamics of in vitro and in vivo
development are not identical. The development of the in vitro embryo up until about 7 days after fertilization is
roughly equivalent to that in vivo. Beyond
this, however, there is no equivalence in development; no primitive streak will
be formed in vitro embryos at
the stage of 14 days (35). Since in
vitro development is much slower then in vivo, such a line is definitely the most secure line before
which, for instance, embryo experimentation can be accomplished without any
fear that the primitive streak can be formed. Day 14 as the line before which
embryo experimentation can be performed is arbitrary in a morally very benign
sense, because it, in the highest degree, excludes the possibility that we make
a mistake concerning the formation of the primitive streak (and, under the
assumption that segmentation is the marker process, to kill a person).
***
It
has to be emphasized at the end that the final decision about whether fertilization
or the segmentation or formation of a cortex or some other process has to be
determinant of moral status is the question of further scientific research and
moral appraisal of scientific facts about these processes. I have only tried to
prove that Continuity Argument failed, that is, that from the more detailed
analysis of the notion of continuity it does not follow that that fertilization
is both necessary and the most reasonable marker event. Consequently, contrary
to the Continuity Argument on which the fertilization approach is based, it can
be argued that the post-fertilization process is continuous and gradual, and
that fertilization is not the determinant of moral status. In other words, it
is possible to accept scientifically and philosophically convincing ideas about
the continuity of developmental process, and at the same time to claim that
scientific practice of embryo experimentation and research are morally
justified.
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Notes
(1) I will rely here on the several influential documents in which
it is assumed the day 14 as a borderline. See, Committee to Consider the
Social, Ethical and Legal Issues Arising from In Vitro Fertilization. Report on
the Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilization, (Prof. Louis
Waller, chairman). Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer; 1984. para. 3.29.;
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology
(Mary Warnock, chair). London: HMSO; 1984. para. 11.19-11.22.
(2) It should be noted here that while such a discussion assumes
that moral status of some medical practices depends on the questions of
personhood or on the determination of the time, event or process when a full
moral status is acquired, there is also an alternative approach. Namely, some
authors claim that the determination of marker events or discussion about the
status of embryo (or fetus) is not relevant for the moral judgement of these
practices. Arguments in favor of this alternative viewpoint can be found on
both sides of the debate. For instance, J. J. Thomson claims that abortion
could be permissible even if fetus is a person, while D. Marquis holds that abortion
would be impermissible even if fetus is not a person. It could be possible to
see a promising alternative with R. Dworkin in stance that moral judgements
should be based instead on the question of the intrinsic value of life or with
L.F. Kerchove & S. Waller in the debate about balancing interest. See J. J.
Thomson, 1971; D. Marquis, 1994; R. M. Dworkin, 1993; L. F. Kerchove & S.
Waller, 1998. It is however far beyond our purposes to compare these general
approaches. We will limit our debate exclusively on the still predominant issue
about the marker event.
(3) See, for instance, T. J. Noonan 1970; M. A. Warren 1973; M.
Tooley 1983; H. J. Morowitz & J. S. Trefil 1992.
(4) See, for instance, John Paul II 1995; J. Finnis 1973; T. J.
Noonan 1970.
(5) R. G. Harison 1978; S. Buckle, K. Dawson, P. Singer 1993.
(6) A number of
philosophers, on both sides, think that it is wrong to destroy such an
individual life – not (or not only) because of what it currently is – but
because of what it has a potential to become. However, this interesting,
relevant and extremely importat discussion about the potentiality argument is
beyond our present interest.
(7) See in K. Dawson, 1993.
(8) G. C. Grisez, 1970; W. Quinn,
1970; T. J. Noonan, 1970; T. Iglesias, 1984.
(9) R. Werner, 1974: R. Wertheimer,
1971; B. Brody, 1978; J. Santamaria, 1982.
(10) K. Dawson, 1993.
(11) H. Kuhse & P. Singer, 1993.
(12) T. J. Noonan, 1991.
(13) C. J. Roberts & C.R. Lowe,
1975.
(14) P. Ramsey, 1970; C.E. Curran, 1978.
(15) H. Kuhse & P. Singer, 1993.
(16) Committe to Consider the Social, Ethical and Legal Issue
Arising from In Vitro Fertilization. Report on the Disposition of Embryos
Produced by In Vitro Fertilization. Report on the Disposition of Embryos
Produced by In Vitro Fertilization, (Prof. Louis Waller, chairman). Melbourne:
Victorian Government Printer; 1984. para. 3.29.; Report of the Committee of
Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology, (Mary Warnock, chair). London:
HMSO; 1984. para. 11.19-11.22.
(17) H.J. Morowitz & J.S. Trefil, 1992.
(18) See in R. McKeon, (ed.), 1930, pp. 439-440.
(19) See, for instance, in R.A. Sorensen, 1988; T. Williamson,
1993; L.F. Kerchove and S. Waller, 1998. K. Ludwig and G. Ray, 2002.
(20) See in T. Horgan, 1997.
(21) Sorites paradoxes can be presented also as argument with
premises and conclusions. Let us see the puzzle Bald man:
Premise 1: The loss of
one hair is too few to nominate a man as bald.
Premise 2: If 1 is few
then 2 are few.
Premise 3: If 2 are few
then 3 are few.
Etc.
Premise 200 000: If 199
999 are few then 200 000 are few.
Conclusion: The loss of
200 000 hairs is too few to nominate a man as bald.
See in T. Williamson,
1993, p. 39.
(22) According to L.F. Kerckhove and S. Waller, a connection
between the debate about personhood and the sorites paradox has been recognized
by R. A. Sorensen and R. Shafer Landau. See, L.F. Kerckhove & S. Waller,
1998.
(23) L.F. Kerckhove & S. Waller,
1998, pp. 179-80.
(24) Ibid., p. 180.
(25) For instance, according to certain epistemic solutions to the
sorites paradox (R. Sorensen, T. Williamson), boundaries exist out in the
mind-independent world, but they are unknown to us. While such a principal
ignorance of a demarcation line can be an acceptable solution in the case of
baldness, the same indifference about our ignorance is unacceptable when we
have to make a moral decision about embryo experimentation or abortion. See R.
A. Sorensen, 1984; T. Williamson, 1994.
(26) It is worth noticing that one of the most important
philosophical dilemmas concerning this issue is whether (i) we are incapable of
identifying one such single point although it really exists, or (ii) we are
incapable to nominate non-arbitrarily one single point as a borderline because
it does not exist (it is assumed the ontological view according to which the
world itself is a fuzzy place). The majority of philosophers who write on
vagueness and sorites paradox take it to be a kind of semantic phenomenon. However,
the debate about these issues is out of our present task. We will assume what
is commonsense view or at least what is evident – that we are incapable non
arbitrarily identifying one single point in the continuous process, not
considering the possible hypothesis about the ontological, epistemic or
semantic reasons for such incapacity.
(27) L.F. Kerckhove & S. Waller, 1998, p. 181.
(28) R. Lane, 2003, p. 69.
(29) John Paul II, 1995.
(30) See in S. Buckle, 1993.
(31) H.J. Morowitz & J.S. Trefil, 1992.
(32) See, for instance, D. Rafman, 1994; R.
Manor, 1997.
(33) Concerning the problem of the vagueness,
T. Horgan defends a position of trnsavalutionism. According to him, there are
two fundamental claims of transvaluationism: (i) The Incoherence Thesis –
vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way; (ii) The Legitimacy Thesis
– vagueness is viable and legitimate nontheless, even an essential aspect of
human thought and speech. He favours the idea of contextual and psychologistic
semantics in which operational standards may vary according to the internal
(similarly to D. Raffman) and external circumstances at hand (similarly to R.
Manor). This means that epistemological and ontological commitments are to be
kept as strict as possible, but never add up to ultimate, reductive, absolute
or universal ones. Finally, he argues that when we force through a sorites
series, the discourse ultimately gets regimented around a “collettivistic” pole
(to be compared with Raffman’s pairwise constraint). See in T. Horgan, 1994,
1997, 1998. See also in B. Van Kerkhove, 2000.
(34) Let us notice that in the
post-fertilization developmental process, in contrast to other sorites series,
there are disagreements about the features that make a person (possession of
human DNA, unique genetic code, viability, functioning cortex, consciousness,
rationality, etc.). For instance, while it is clear what features make an egg
hard boiled or what features characterize puberty, there is no consensus about
the properties which define a person. However, when scientists and philosophers
would agree what properties define a person, a fact that a developmental
process is continuous would not prevent us from defining a relevant sequence.
On the other hand, it is possible to say that it is not possible in principle
todefine the features that make a person. However, in such a case, the very
fact of continuity will not be a reason why we cannot identify a marker event,
what it is claimed by Continuity Argument.
(35) R.G. Edwards, 1986.