Brief commentary on Michael Williams’ Criticism of Agrippan Scepticism

Armando Cintora
Departamento de Filosofía
Universidad Autònoma Metropolitana
Ciudad de Mexico
e-mail: cintoral@prodigy.net.mx

We check the story of Napoleon, but not whether all the reports about him are based on sense-deception, forgery and the like. For whenever we test anything, we are already presupposing something that is not tested . . .

(Wittgenstein, OC, 163)

1. Introduction
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ABSTRACT. M. Williams’s (1999 and 2001) analysis of the Prior Grounding Conception (PGC) of epistemic justification - a conception allegedly behind the Agrippan trilemma- is reviewed and it is contrasted with the Default Challenge Conception of justification (DChC)- the alternative conception of epistemic justification championed by Williams. It is argued that the default entitlements of the DChC are a euphemism for epistemically arbitrary stipulations (for a contextualized non epistemic dogmatism); and that while the PGC might lead to sceptical paradoxes, the DChC leads to a paradoxical pancriticism, and which of these two paradoxes one leans to will be a matter of taste or temperament. Finally it is argued that the DChC is neither an adequate description of our philosophic, nor, it seems, of our ordinary epistemic practice. It is then concluded that the PGC is the superior conception, even if it might lead to pyrrhonian scepticism. We conclude by openly arguing in favour of a type of non-
epistemic dogmatism even if it has pyrrhonian implications. Theses, however, that don’t have to be inimical to scientific research.

1. Introduction

In several places M. Williams has characterized Agrippan scepticism, (the scepticism about the possibility of justifying any beliefs), as resting on the so called “Agrippan trilemma” which consists of ancient argumentative strategies for inducing if not a universal, at least a wide suspension of judgement about the possibility of justified belief. This trilemma aims to show to the dogmatist – he who claims knowledge of some proposition p - that once he is asked for a justification for his belief for the truth of p he cannot provide it, without falling into one of the following three unpalatable alternatives:

1) Regression: the justification of p requires an antecedent justification q and so on ad infinitum, since we cannot know where justification starts we should if rational suspend judgment regarding p.
2) Stipulation: it occurs when, in order to avoid regression, the dogmatist establishes something q as starting a justificatory chain for p, while q lacks antecedent justification. This manoeuvre is epistemically arbitrary and so we should if rational suspend judgment regarding the justification of p.
3) Circularity: it is another alternative to regression in which what it is used for the justification of (p) serves as a justification for what is claimed as its evidence (q). Given that it is not possible to establish which belief justifies the other, we should if rational suspend judgement.

Each of these horns is motivated by disagreement (diaphonia) between two contrary beliefs (p and not-p), a disagreement that each of them tries to resolve.

Given this trilemma, if infinite regress and circularity were vicious justificatory strategies, the dogmatist would be left with mere stipulation and he would leave his beliefs unjustified; and if rational, the dogmatist ought to withhold assent about the correctness of most, if not all, of his p’s.

Now, Williams (2001: 147, and 2004b: 129-130) claims that if the Agrippan trilemma is to amount to an argument for a radical and general scepticism of the possibility of epistemic justification it must presuppose a Prior Grounding
Conception of justification (PGC), and if so, then Pyrrhonian scepticism won’t be natural or intuitive, something that Williams believes it must be, if it is to be a serious problem for our ordinary attributions of knowledge. Williams (2001: 147 and 2004b: 129) analyzes the PGC as follows:

(PG1) “Personal justification does not accrue to us: it must be earned by epistemically responsible behaviour.
(PG2) “It is never epistemically responsible to believe a proposition true when one’s grounds for believing it true are less than adequate.”
(PG3) “Grounds are evidence: propositions that count in favour of the truth of the proposition believed.”
(PG4) “For a person’s belief to be adequately grounded, it is not sufficient for there merely to be appropriate evidence for it. Rather, the believer himself or herself must possess (and make proper use of) evidence that makes the proposition believed (very) likely to be true.”

The PGC recalls the Aristotelian demonstrative conception of knowledge (An. Post.:1.2), according to which S knows p iff (1) S has a justification q for p, and (2) S knows the justification q. So this trilemma assumes an internalist requirement for justification for which every instance of justification rests on other justifying beliefs accessible to the subject, just what (PG3) and (PG4) prescribe.

To clarify William’s analysis of the PGC it is useful to realize that Williams recognises two dimensions for justification: “epistemic responsibility” and “adequate grounding”. Responsibility is subjective - personal justification - according to which S is justified in believing p iff S has satisfied his epistemic duties, in particular the (internalist) requirement of accessibility to the reasons on behalf of S; and as in any traditional deontic conception of justification epistemic responsibility may be not truth conducive. On the other hand, adequate grounding is objective justification, where “adequate” means truth conducive, even if S has not epistemic access to that justification; William’s favourite account of adequate grounding is reliabilism. Both dimensions are logically independent: we can be epistemically responsible and cite as our evidence false propositions, or we can have adequate grounding without epistemic access to it. These two axes are related in so far as we value epistemic responsibility because it reduces the risk of error “and this makes epistemically responsible behaviour itself a kind of grounding.” (Williams, 2004b: 128).
With this distinction at hand, it is clear that the particular kind of contextualism proposed by Williams is supposed to handle internalist and externalist motivations regarding justification: PG1 and PG2 pretend to satisfy the deontological character of epistemic justification, while, PG3 establishes a dependence of responsibility on grounding which excludes any kind of externalist characterization of grounding. PG3 and PG4 prescribe that the grounds to believe p must be evidence cognitively accessible to the subject.

Analogously, Williams claims that that the Agrippan sceptic assumes the PGC because this sceptic always considers a demand for justification as reasonable - a dialectical demand - without the PGC the sceptic loses his right to make this demand unrestrictedly:

To get from what he argues to what he concludes, the sceptic must take it for granted that no belief is responsibly held unless it rests on adequate and citable evidence. He needs the Prior Grounding Requirement. (2001: 148, 150)

For the PGC the distinction between responsibility and grounding collapses, hence every case of responsible belief is believing always on the basis of explicit and citable evidence and this opens the gates to the sceptic, since there will be basic beliefs for which we won’t be able to offer evidentialist justifications.

If we grant Williams this diagnosis, he then proceeds to oppose to the PGC a Default and Challenge Conception (DChC), which is characterized in terms of the difference:

“… between legal systems that treat the accused as guilty unless proved innocent and those that do the opposite, granting presumptive innocence and throwing the burden of proof onto the accuser. Adopting the second model epistemic entitlement is the default status of a person’s beliefs and assertions. One is entitled to a belief or assertion (...) in the absence of appropriate ‘defeaters’: that is, reasons to think that one is not so entitled. Appropriate defeaters cite reasonable and relevant error-possibilities (...) In claiming knowledge, I commit myself to my belief’s being adequately grounded – formed by a reliable method- but not to my having already established its well-groundedness. This sort of defence is necessary only given an appropriate challenge: a positive reason to think that I reached my belief in some unreliable manner.” (2001: 149)
The DChC requires some prima facie entitlements in order to start the process of epistemic justification - or that of epistemic criticism - and to avoid the regress of justification, but these entitlements are left unjustified and assumed by default - without any reasons in their favour, so the DChC is a kind of dogmatism. At this point it becomes clear that Williams conflates a dialectic argumentative process with one of epistemic justification, thus he tries to isolate a domain of beliefs – the entitlements – from demands of justification; this move has been criticized by Rescorla (2009) and Cling (2007).

We should distinguish, however, between two kinds of dogmatism: epistemic and non-epistemic. In order to clarify the differences between them, let us focus on the supposed justificatory force of our sensorial perceptions. Those who take perception at face value are able to appeal to perceptual beliefs as evidence in favour of empirical beliefs (whenever they do not have reasons to suppose that their perceptual beliefs are false). That is, in order to justify my empirical belief –‘there is a hand in front of me’- I appeal to my perceptual belief –‘I see a hand in front of me’- as a justification for the truth of my empirical belief. This Moorean stance is what we call here “epistemic dogmatism”. Where the dogma is the assumption that my visual system is reliable, an assumption taken without justification, furthermore, in order to avoid an epistemic regression of justifications, defenders of epistemic dogmatism consider their perceptual experiences as evidence in favour of the truth of their perceptual beliefs.

On the other hand, there are others for whom perception only has justificatory force if we justify the existence of the external world (that is, if we justify the reliability of our visual system) but according to the lesson taught by Cartesian types scenarios it is impossible to have evidence in favour of this belief. Many thinkers –following Hume’s naturalism - have argued, therefore, that we can retain the belief in the existence of the external world in a rational way (rational in a pragmatic sense, but not in a theoretical sense) by appealing to some ingrained psychological, social, cultural or pragmatic mechanism, which would impose this belief to us. These theoreticians are known as non-epistemic dogmatists.

Defenders of non-epistemic dogmatism consider as dogmas some very basic beliefs, which instead of being justified by some truth conducive evidence are merely described or explained via their pragmatic or psychological import and
then it is claimed that this description-explanation provides a ‘justification’ of sorts for these central beliefs, such as a belief in the existence of the external world.

Non-epistemic dogmatism has become a recurrent stratagem in contemporary epistemology, mainly because it has been offered as an antidote against Cartesian type sceptical challenges, a desideratum that in the end epistemic dogmatism cannot meet, given the impossibility of justifying our belief in the existence of the external world non-viciously via evidence; Williams’ DChC implies a non-epistemic dogmatism.

Williams, however, asserts that justification by default is not tantamount to uncriticisable assumptions, that is, these entitlements are allegedly open to concrete and justified challenges (though we will argue contra Williams further below that not everything is challengeable or criticisable). In Williams’ perspective the subject must be able to answer these type of challenges in order to have epistemic responsibility, while on the other hand, claims of knowledge can be grounded externalistically (appealing, for example, to the alleged or putative reliability of some cognitive processes).

The main difference between the PGC and DChC is that for the former justification is exclusively an inferential matter; that is, any entitlement must be the conclusion of an inference from other premises, and these premises must be at least potentially accessible to the subject, and hence they are a personal or individual achievement. On the other hand, the DChC allows entitlements by default, which may not be an individualistic achievement, but a social one. DChC retains the relation between responsibility and grounding, but in a deflationary way: it does not require that the subject be able to sustain responsibly any claim to knowledge.

2. Critical comments

1. Default entitlements seem to be a euphemism for unjustified dogma

Williams complains that:
“The PGR generates a vicious regress of justification by enforcing a gross asymmetry in the justificational responsibilities of claimants and challengers. Because claimants are saddled with a standing obligation to cite evidence,
challengers are accorded a standing licence to request that it be cited.” (2001: 151.)
Sure there is an asymmetry, but this results from the dogmatist’s claim to knowledge and since he claims knowledge, a request for justification is just natural.
Williams’ DChC passes the onus of the proof from the claimant to the challenger: why should we doubt the reliability of our cognitive faculties? But transferring the onus of the proof to my opponent – even if it were a legitimate move- would not justify my claim. Thus, Williams’ default entitlements seem to be a euphemism for unjustified dogma (not an epistemic dogma, but a non-epistemic one), i.e., an euphemism for the mode of hypothesis, for example, if the reliability of allegedly reliable processes can be taken for granted, without justification, as epistemic entitlements, this is dogmatism with a constrained and self serving conception of epistemic responsibility, where unjustified dogmas, nevertheless justify. Thus for Williams’ epistemic responsibility requires only that one responds to appropriate challenges, and hence the DChC leads merely to dialectical justification: to conveniently shared assumptions.

If we are interested in truth (if we are interested in relevant and justified true beliefs) we require a justification (in the sense of grounding) of objective reliability and not mere shared agreements, say about the alleged reliability of some cognitive processes, methods, sources or rules of inference: we require more than mere psychological, social or cultural inclinations to believe in their reliability.

2. The DChC seems to lead to a form of epistemic relativism

Williams requires that appropriate defeaters “cite reasonable and relevant error-possibilities.” (2001: 149.) Then it seems that a community could be epistemically entitled to whatever beliefs it is partial to, just by discounting challenges as irrelevant and/or unreasonable - given their background beliefs or alleged entitlements. One could imagine, for example, an ideological or religious community (say, of ‘scientific creationists’ or of Lysenkoists) which would discount challenges to some of its core beliefs (say, about the origin of life in our planet or about genetics) as unreasonable, absurd or heretical and which would ignore or explain away any empirical inadequacies via ad hoc hypotheses. This putative community could then go on to argue that ad hoc hypotheses are kosher whenever its core beliefs or principles (for example
that revelation is a reliable source of knowledge) are challenged; they could go on to claim that this last methodological prescription is one of their epistemic entitlements. If so, the DChC seems to lead to a form of epistemic relativism, where what is reasonable depends on cultural or psychological biases.

3. The DChC may be ad hoc

For Williams the claimant is entitled to his claims if there aren’t any challenges and although Agrippa provides a general challenge Williams disqualifies the Agrippan challenge, since it is not a concrete and detailed challenge, but a global or a “brute challenge” (a presuppositionless challenge, although Agrippa tacitly presumes the PGC) (2004b: 133-4). Now, if this injunction against general and brute challenges and doubts were motivated only by a desire to evade sceptical challenges, then it would be an ad hoc manoeuvre, but Williams has explicitly condemned ad hoc tactics [Cf. Williams (2001:155, supra.)], so if consistent he cannot welcome them. Alternatively, if his prescription is not an ad hoc stratagem, then what is the justification of this injunction? Williams may retort that the DChC is not ad hoc because it allegedly describes our everyday epistemic practice and that would be its justification; moreover even “if both models [the PGC and the DChC] proved to fit everyday epistemic practices more or less equally well – it would still be theoretically reasonable to prefer the default and challenge account. By hypothesis, that model fits the agreed facts equally well and has the added merit of not generating gratuitous, sceptical paradoxes. It is therefore a better account of ordinary justification.” (2001: 153)

4. The DChC begs the question against the sceptic

Williams (2004b: 133) uses our alleged everyday epistemic practice as the criterion to decide which of the two conceptions of justification in competition (PGC and DChC) is most natural and intuitive, but our ordinary epistemic practice has a built-in-bias against scepticism, given that it assumes common sense, or armchair knowledge, so it is not surprising that whatever injunctions we might get from this practice are going to be anti-sceptical. Appealing to our ordinary epistemic practices is a pragmatic strategy that ignores the sceptical challenge.
On the other hand, what is intuitive and natural for some - in an ordinary context of investigation - is not always so for others, as is shown by the wide disagreements amongst epistemologists.

5. The DChC is not a tout court adequate description of our everyday epistemic practice

Williams claims that appropriate challenges can be “defeaters [that] cite evidence that one’s assertion is false.” (Williams, 2001: 149) He doesn’t consider, however, the possibility of balanced evidence for or against an assertion, nor the possibility of the absence of any evidence for the truth of a proposition, scenarios where our ordinary practice would recommend suspension of judgement about the truth of the statement, a suspension of judgement that the PGC recommends, but not the DCHC, so the PGC seems closer to our ordinary practice at least in certain situations. Thus, consider the following example:

1. One observes a red-looking wall
2. That wall is red
3. Putative entitlement: My visual system is working properly

Where (1) justifies (2), given (3). Now suppose that: “you are knowledgeably participating in a double-blind trial of a new hallucinogen, affecting just colour vision. Half the trialists have the pill and half a placebo. The trialists are advised that the former group will suffer a temporary systematic inversion of their colour experience, but have no other relevant information, in particular none providing any reason for a view about which group they are in. Clearly this information defeats (1) as a warrant for (2). Its effect is that your evidence (1) now provides no reason whatever for believing (2). But it does not give sufficient reason to doubt (3) if that is required to mean: to believe not 3. You should be open minded about (3).” (Wright, 2007: 41)

Open-mindedness about (3) will defeat the warrant of (1) for (2). Now, if balanced evidence for and against (3) defeats the warrant provided by (1) for (2), why shouldn’t the absence of evidence for (3) defeat the warrant provided by (1) for (2)? So that if (1) is going to provide sufficient warrant for (2) it seems one would require an independent warrant for (3) whenever there is balanced evidence for and against 3 or when there is no evidence for 3: precisely what PGC recommends. If so, the DChC does not agree simpliciter with our every-
day epistemic practice. But neither is the DChC in agreement with our dialectical practice since any challenge – even brute challenges – is legitimate; brute challenges don’t contradict any rule of rational discourse, if so in a reasoned discourse with interlocutors there is not a privileged class of beliefs immune to challenge.

6. Williams grants an unjustified epistemic privilege to our everyday epistemic practice, and its alleged DChC, even when debating with the philosophical sceptic.

There are alternative criteria, i.e., non-ordinary epistemic practices, such as our philosophical epistemic practices, and these latter practices have more stringent standards of scrutiny. In particular, in a philosophical level of scrutiny – as this one- nothing, or very little, ought to be considered as obvious or ought to be taken for granted as an entitlement; hence even if both the PGC and the DChC turned out to fit evenly our ordinary epistemic practice, it seems that the PGC (with its global requirement of justification for claims of knowledge) would fit better our philosophical practice. Thus Stroud (1989 and 1996) has argued that philosophy is interested in human knowledge in general and that for philosophy global questions about our knowledge are unavoidable.

Our philosophical practice can be understood as an endeavour where cognitive subjects aim to full rationality and complete epistemic responsibility as regulatory ideals, even if full rationality and epistemic responsibility may never be fully attained (as some sceptics would argue), even if these aims could only be approximated till some unknown maxima. Our ordinary epistemic practice due to pragmatic constraints will often fall short of these maxima, but we can (and should) ignore these constraints while in a philosophical context.

Now, from a contextualist perspective, as that of Williams, one should raise the epistemic standards (that is they should not be kept invariant) to the philosophical level of scrutiny (and opt for the PGC) when arguing with the philosophical sceptic, yet Williams grants priority to our everyday epistemic practices even when debating with the philosophical sceptic. Why this unjustified bias?
7. Due to logical reasons not any claim can even in principle be challenged: not any claim can be rationally argued to be false or incorrect, something the DChC seems to assume

Williams has criticized a strongly justificationist conception of rationality (2001: 87), one for which it is always irrational to hold beliefs that are not adequately justified (on the basis of evidence); and this is a conception of rationality that goes hand in hand with the PGC. Given this criticism, Williams should have an alternative conception of rationality, an alternative that could accommodate his DChC of justification as rational. And then he could go on to recommend that if rational one should prefer the DChC to the PGC and this injunction - given his pragmatist affinities (2001: 241) - would require that one should be able to act according to the DChC. The question now arises if any claim can, at least in principle, be challenged. The following argument shows – by a reductio - that such a pancriticism would lead to logical paradox and that it is therefore impossible. Thus:

(A): All positions are open to criticism or challenge.
And because of what ‘A’ asserts, because of its intended comprehensiveness, it then follows,
(B): A is open to criticism. And,

Since (B) is implied by (A), any criticism of (B) will constitute a criticism of (A), and thus show that (A) is open to criticism. Assuming that a criticism of (B) argues that (B) is false, we may argue: if (B) is false, then (A) is false; but an argument showing (A) to be false (and thus criticizing it) shows (B) to be true. Thus, if (B) is false, then (B) is true. Any attempt to criticize (B) demonstrates (B); thus (B) is uncriticisable, and (A) is false.

Hence we discover that while the search for justification (either of a first order evidentialist justification of some proposition, or of a second order justification of the putative reliability of some cognitive processes or capacities) leads into Agrippa’s trilemma and to alleged “sceptical paradoxes”, the search for pancriticism, in its turn, leads to logical paradox, that is, we have discovered that due to logical reasons not every claim can, even in principle, be challenged: not every claim can be argued to be false or incorrect. Which of these two paradoxes is preferred seems to be a matter of taste, of temperament, and if de gustibus non disputandum est, then the matter would
end there, and which of the two conceptions of justification (PGC or DCHC) is selected would be a matter of taste or temperament.

Williams could reply, however, that pancriticism’s logical paradox can be avoided by granting that some entitlements cannot be challenged, that some entitlements are context independent, that is, that there are entitlements – or “methodological necessities” (Williams, 2001: 160), that are so, in any and every epistemic context. But if he were to concede that some entitlements are shared by every context of inquiry, then there would be a tension with his rejection of epistemological realism – his rejection of the idea that beliefs fall into epistemological natural kinds exclusively in virtue of their content. This because if the DChC were to imply that some entitlements (say, perception, memory, etc.,) are reliable in every research context, then these entitlements would belong to a privileged epistemic class, something that would explain their universality. Therefore either Williams abandons the DChC and its tacit conception of rationality: pancriticism, or he welcomes epistemological realism.

3. Conclusion

If the PGC were the better conception of epistemic justification (as it seems to be in a philosophical research context, and at least sometimes for our ordinary practice) then Agrippa would show that not everything is justifiable without falling into one of its unpalatable horns, and if regress and circularity were vicious justificatory strategies, then we would be left only with stipulation.

These stipulations (epistemic dogmas) won’t justify because they cannot inherit what they lack, but if they were justified they would justify our various beliefs. We could believe these stipulations only as if they were true or correct (though we would not accept them to be true ), while suspending judgment about their objective truth-value ; and we could opt for a passive belief of some stipulations, over other possible ones, by passively following our psychological propensities and social and cultural uses and customs . Possible examples of such stipulations or dogmas not justifiable, nor criticisable could be modus ponens , a probabilistic inductive rule of inference , the reliability of sources of knowledge, basic criteria of proper evidence, criteria of rational belief and of rational action, criteria for desirable goals and criteria on how to prioritize these goals – when these goals are inconsistent. These stipulations while epistemically arbitrary can be motivated , or caused, dialectically by ex-
tra epistemic factors – although this creates the logical possibility of a relativ-
ism of different and incompatible dogmas. This is an innocuous relativism
since one suspends judgement about the objective truth-value of these stipula-
tions or dogmas. The most basic dogma would be the following conditional:

If our dogmatic presuppositions were - per impossibile - justified as true,
then those true beliefs justified by these presuppositions would be real
knowledge.

We can proceed hoping that this conditional be correct, something that it
could well be given the success of our science and technology (and because
given this success our sceptical arguments could be wrong.) This hope, how-
ever, may be a-rational - or irrational - because it cannot itself be justified
without our unjustified dogmatic presuppositions.

Both criticisability and justifiability are logically limited. This of course is
not new; Wittgenstein (and more recently J. Worrall) seems to have arrived at
similar conclusions. If so, there would be little, if any, real knowledge, al-
though following dominant custom and usage we could grant these dogmas a
honorary justifying role and we could call ‘knowledge’ (because of a charit-
able attitude) those true beliefs justified by these dogmas.

It may now be argued that we don’t need real knowledge, that plain
‘knowledge’ is sufficient for our practical endeavours. It may be so, as long as
by the “grace of nature” our beliefs turn out to be true, as long as nature
doesn’t let us down or defeat us . The philosopher, though, would want to
substitute this gift, this grace, with a search for justifications (that is, with ju-
stifications that do not end in vicious circularity or vicious regress), but when
we search for these justifications, we discover that none appear to be forth-
coming.

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